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OMNIVEILLANCE, GOOGLE, PRIVACY IN
PUBLIC, AND THE RIGHT TO YOUR DIGITAL
IDENTITY: A TORT FOR RECORDING AND
DISSEMINATING AN INDIVIDUAL'S IMAGE
OVER THE INTERNET
Josh Blackman*
INTRODUCTION
Photographing people in public places is nothing new.
Internet giant Google recently began photographing
American streets with a new technology entitled Google
Street View.' But Google does not only record streets.2 Its
high-resolution cameras are able to capture people, both
outside, and inside of their homes through open windows,
engaged in private matters.' Those captured by Google's
cameras are not even aware they are being recorded, as
Google uses nondescript recording equipment to clandestinely
record people in their natural state.' These images are then
disseminated to users all over the world.5 Although the
present iteration of this technology only displays previously
recorded images, current privacy laws do not prevent Google
from implementing a system that broadcasts live video feeds
* George Mason University School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2009;
Law Clerk for the Honorable Kim R. Gibson, U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, 2009-2010; Articles Editor, George Mason Law
Review, 2008-2009; Pennsylvania State University, B.S., Information, Sciences,
and Technology, December 2005, High Distinction. I thank my family for their
support while writing this article. I dedicate this article to James Madison.
1. Miguel Helft, Google Photos Stir a Debate over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2007, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/O1/technology/Olprivate.html.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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of street corners throughout America. This threat is all the
more real in light of projected trends in technology and the
path of future Internet developments. In the future,
individuals could be able to visit Google's web site and search
for a specific time, date, and location. Users will thus be able
to witness what happened at any place and to what people, at
any moment in Google's recorded history. Such pervasive
human monitoring is the essence of the phenomenon this
article has termed omniveillance.
Omniveillance is a form of omnipresent and omniscient
digital surveillance in public places that is broadcasted
indiscriminately throughout the Internet. Due to the
unselective nature of this technology, neither
newsworthiness, nor a person's solitude, is of any concern.
The question thus arises-what limitations exist for private
entities to monitor individuals and broadcast their recordings
throughout the Internet?
The two major privacy torts, public disclosure of private
facts and intrusion upon seclusion, are concerned with
balancing privacy and free speech. Yet, they are largely
incapable of remedying the intrusiveness of emerging
omniveillance technologies. The tort of public disclosure of
private facts is restricted by a newsworthiness exception that
allows the reproduction of private facts as long as the
information possesses a non-zero amount of social content.6
Under this test, almost anything can have some social value.
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion prevents violating a
person's solitude, but does not apply when a person is in
public.7  This tort is impotent for anyone who is not
barricaded in his home. Thus, under both of these torts,
victims of omniveillance are left without a remedy.
When these torts were developed, the level of invasion
into an individual's privacy was limited by photographers
making a choice to photograph an individual at the
opportunity cost of not photographing someone else. With
new technology, the choice is no longer which individual to
photograph, but which city to photograph in its entirety.
Each individual could be not only indiscriminately
photographed, but also persistently filmed, leading to a state
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
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of constant monitoring. This is an undesirable state, and will
only get worse as new technology develops. This article
proposes the right to your digital identity through a tort that
balances privacy rights with free speech and provides a
remedy for victims of omniveillance.
In Part I, this article explores privacy, including the birth
of privacy in America, modern privacy law, and how privacy
can promote free speech and expression. This article does not
focus on government surveillance or Fourth Amendment
issues. In Part II, this article introduces and explains
omniveillance, and the first potential omniveiller, Google
Street View. Next, this section takes a journey into the not-
so-distant future of omniveillance, where no privacy can exist
in public. Cameras record everyone, everywhere, at anytime,
and rebroadcast this information onto the Internet. Based on
the inadequacy of current privacy protections to protect
citizens from this looming threat, this section establishes the
need for a tort to remedy the victims of omniveillance.
In Part III, this article proposes a new tort-the right to
your digital identity. The tort has four factors that are
balanced to create a workable equilibrium between privacy
and free speech. This tort emerged from existing privacy
torts, borrowing from many areas of the law to develop a
viable framework to remedy victims of omniveillance. The
first element of the tort results from a synergy of criminal
law, paparazzi statutes, and voyeurism laws. This part
modifies the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and adopts a
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. The second
element serves as a reflection on society's changing
perceptions of offensiveness. It incorporates part of
California's modern paparazzi statute' and modifies the tort
of public disclosure of private facts, lowering the standard
from highly offensive to offensive, in order to mirror
contemporary sensibilities. The third element of the tort
borrows from federal and state voyeurism statutes and
modifies the tort of public disclosure of private facts. This
section focuses on the new, more pervasive methods of
electronic data dissemination over social networks and viral
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (Deering 2005) (imposing harsher civil
liability for members of the paparazzi who overstep their boundaries in
following celebrities).
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Internet distributions, and accords greater liability to larger
and more indiscriminate distributions. The fourth element
weighs the newsworthiness exception from the tort of public
disclosure of private facts against the level of intrusion into
an individual's privacy. This element is distinguished from
the test defined by the Supreme Court in Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,9 which greatly weakened the public disclosure of
privacy tort.1° Following Florida Star, courts have found it
difficult to find in favor of privacy." This newly proposed
newsworthiness test attempts to strike a balance so that
privacy has a chance to outweigh free speech when applied in
our courts. Enforced as a common-law tort, where each state
can define the contours of the tort to meet its citizens' specific
needs, the right to one's digital identity is a viable remedy for
victims of omniveillance.
I. BACKGROUND
Privacy has a long and proud tradition in America,
playing a critical role in promoting free speech and
developing some of our most important institutions. 2 James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published the
Federalist Papers under the pseudonym Publius." Benjamin
Franklin used more than forty pen names. 4 Secret balloting
is one of the hallmarks of American democracy.'- The
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was conducted in absolute
privacy.16 Many of the framers acknowledged that without
secrecy and privacy, the Constitution could not have been
written for fear of retribution."' In the twenty years following
9. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
10. See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2388 (1996) (arguing that after
Florida Star, the tort of public disclosure of private fact tort is "alive, but on life
support").
11. Id.
12. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 139-40 (2007).
13. Id. at 140; see THE FEDERALIST.
14. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 140.
15. See Michael Waterstone, Civil Rights and the Administration of
Elections-toward Secret Ballots and Polling Place Access, 8 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 101, 106 (2004).
16. Max Farrand, Introduction to 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at xi (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1937)
(1819).
17. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 134-39
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the drafting of the United States Constitution, six presidents,
fifteen cabinet members, twenty senators, and thirty-four
congressmen published political writings anonymously,
advocating political beliefs that they chose not to publicly
disclose."1
Scholars generally consider the seminal law review
article The Right to Privacy9 by Samuel Warren and future
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis as the first attempt to
explain American privacy jurisprudence." In his dissent to
the landmark Florida Star decision, Justice White noted that
the privacy torts derived from this article were "one of the
most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century."2'
From its genesis, the right to privacy, as described by Warren
and Brandeis, faced an uphill battle as a result of Dean
Prosser's codification and limitation of these principles in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. In the decades since the
Restatement, the privacy torts have gone into hibernation.
However, with the proper understanding, they remain ready
and able to protect privacy. This section will provide a brief
exploration of the history of privacy, its subsequent decline,
and establish how privacy can promote free speech and
expression.
A. The Birth of Privacy in America
The impetus for the Samuel Warren and Justice
Brandeis article is generally regarded to be the proliferation
of Kodak cameras2 2 taking "instantaneous photographs" that
(Harvard Univ. Press 1947) (1928).
18. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 139-40.
19. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
20. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 108 (discussing the significance of
the article to privacy law).
21. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
22. See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 124 (2000) ('[Iln the years
before the development of photography in the mid-1800's, even mirrors were not
universal in British and American life. Imagine the realization that for the first
time the very essence of your being-your visage-could be captured by
someone else-used and controlled by someone else."); Robert E. Mensel,
"Kodakers Lying in Wait": Amateur Photography and the Right of Privacy in
New York, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28 (1991) (noting that the widespread use of the
Eastman Kodak snap cameras in the late nineteenth century started a
phenomenon which allowed a new breed of photographers to take photographs
instantly without consent of the subjects, whereas in the past subjects of
317
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the authors regarded as invading "the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life."23 As Warren and Justice Brandeis
lamented, these cameras "rendered it possible to take
photographs surreptitiously,"24 greatly weakening the right of
people to live private lives. In response to this new
phenomena, with the goal to prevent the "evil of the invasion
of privacy by the newspapers" and "provide a remedy for the
unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons,"
Warren and Justice Brandeis set out to build from the blocks
of existing common law a right to privacy that would protect
the "privacy of the individual."25 Analyzing other doctrines of
law, including slander, libel, trade secret, and intellectual
property, the scholars formed "the right 'to be let alone."'26
The article states that the common law "secures to each
individual" the right to control how his being can be
communicated to others. 27  The goal of this right was to
protect the "inviolate personality" and the person's feelings
from injury.25
Understanding that certain aspects of society are of
"public or general interest,"29 Warren and Justice Brandeis
excluded the right to privacy for those "who . . . have
renounced the right to live their lives screened from public
observation."3  Among these "men of the first class" are
candidates for public office, a person in a public position, or
anyone who has assumed a position "which makes their
doings legitimate matters of public investigation,"31 thus
planting the seeds for the modern day newsworthiness
exceptions to the public disclosure of private facts tort.
However, Warren and Justice Brandeis were quite eager to
apply this right to privacy for "those persons with whose
affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being
dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity."32
photographs had to sit for prolonged periods of time).
23. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 195.
24. Id. at 211.
25. Id. at 195, 197.
26. Id. at 195 (quoting Judge Cooley).
27. Id. at 198.
28. Id. at 211.
29. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 214.
30. Id. at 215.
31. Id. at 215-16.
32. Id. at 214.
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Warren and Justice Brandeis concluded "[s]ome things all
men alike are entitled to keep from popular curiosity,
whether in public life or not."33 This article caused a
renaissance in privacy law ideals. 4
B. Modern Privacy Law
In the decades following the landmark Warren and
Brandeis article, many cases were decided that relied on the
right to be let alone5.3  Esteemed torts scholar Dean William
Prosser concluded that the "law of privacy comprises four
distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the
plaintiff ... that each represents an interference with the
right of the plaintiff. . . 'to be left alone.' "36 The four torts
that were later codified by Dean Prosser, who served as the
reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, were (1) public
disclosure of private facts,37 (2) intrusion upon seclusion,38 (3)
33. Id. at 216.
34. See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren's The Right to Privacy
and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 650 (2002) (noting
that Warren and Brandeis's article "get[s] the credit for spawning a mini-
revolution in the law, a revolution that eventually spread throughout the
United States and throughout several fields of law to give us a wide-ranging
right to privacy").
35. See, e.g., Pasevich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga.
1905) ("The body of a person cannot be put on exhibition at any time or at any
place without his consent. The right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all
proper times, in all proper places, and in a proper manner is embraced within
the right of personal liberty. The right to withdraw from the public gaze at
such times as a person may see fit, when his presence in public is not demanded
by an rule of law, is also embraced within the right of personal liberty ... [the
use of a person's identity against his will makes him] under the control of
another... [so that] he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave.").
36. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) ("One who gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public."). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
cmt. c (1977) (explaining that the Restatement sets a very high standard to
determine what is highly offensive, by commenting that "[tihe ordinary
reasonable man does not take offense at a report in a newspaper that he has
returned from a visit, gone camping in the woods or given a party at his house
for his friends") with Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 195 (seeking to
provide a "remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private
persons," who quite possibly could have gone camping in the woods).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). Intrusion upon
seclusion as codified in the Restatement occurs when "[olne who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or
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appropriation of name or likeness,39 and (4) false light.4° By
enumerating the torts, Dean Prosser clarified the existing law
to make it easier for practitioners to apply. However, Dean
Prosser was very skeptical and critical about the right to
privacy, in particular because it gave the government the
power to censor the press.4' Instead of merely recapitulating
the Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis article and the
subsequent case law, Dean Prosser was, in essence, placing
his own torts perspective on the right to privacy. He
fabricated a closely related, yet substantially different, body
his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."
Id. The Restatement sets a very high standard for an intrusion upon seclusion
in public in that "there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his
underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may
still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652B cmt. c (1977). But see Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a paparazzo violated the
privacy of Mrs. Onassis "[when weighed against the de minimis public
importance of the daily activities of the defendant, Galella's [the paparazzo's]
constant surveillance, his obtrusive and intruding presence, was unwarranted
and unreasonable"); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1971)
("[W]e have little difficulty in concluding that clandestine photography of the
plaintiff in his den ... resulting in his emotional distress warrants recovery for
invasion of privacy in California."); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765,
771 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that "[a] person does not automatically make public
everything he does merely by being in a public place, and the mere fact that
Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the right to discover the amount of
money he was withdrawing").
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject
to liability to the other for the invasion of privacy.").
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) ("One who gives
publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public
in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a)
the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which
the other would be placed.").
41. Prosser, supra note 36, at 422. Prosser criticized the development of the
privacy laws as going on "without any plan, without much realization of what is
happening or its significance, and without any consideration of its danger." Id.
There had been little "attempt to inquire what interests we are protecting, and
against what kind of conduct." Id. at 423. He feared that the courts "have
accepted a power of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read,
extending very much beyond that which they have always had under the law of
defamation." Id. (emphasis added). While Prosser stopped short of calling the
privacy torts wrong, he concluded that it is "high time that we realize what we
are doing, and give some consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we
are to call a halt." Id.
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of law. Prosser was actually attempting to recreate the law
as he saw fit, much like he did when he spontaneously
recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on a mental injury.42
Dean Prosser's privacy torts had the effect of halting the
evolution of privacy law, as no one else has proposed any
viable privacy torts in the four decades since his enumeration
in the landmark law review article.4 3  In addition, Dean
Prosser's torts have become the most widely accepted
conception of American privacy interests, as most states have
accepted these torts via the adoption of Prosser's Restatement
(Second) of Torts."
Following Dean Prosser's codification of the privacy torts,
generally, a person who is photographed in public is
essentially left without a remedy.45 The two most useful torts
suited to solve the problem of being photographed are the
intrusion upon seclusion tort and the public disclosure of
private fact tort. The intrusion upon seclusion tort is
interpreted to only apply when the victim was in a private
location, thereby excluding anyone who happened to be on
public property.46 The public disclosure of private facts torts
is interpreted only to apply when the matter disclosed had no
newsworthy value.47  Because newsworthiness is broadly
defined, and judges generally defer to editors to determine
newsworthiness after Florida Star, 4 a photograph with even
the slightest social value is publishable without fear of
liability.49 These two restraining factors severely limit a
plaintiffs ability to recover for a privacy violation when
42. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 149 (2007).
43. Id. at 152-53.
44. See Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship
Privacy through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887,
897 (2006) ("At least forty-five states have adopted one or more of the privacy
torts, nearly always following the Restatement definitions.").
45. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Nat'l Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927, 931 (D. Me. 1988)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977)).
46. See Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953).
47. See e.g., id. at 443.
48. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989) (White, J., dissenting)
(discussing the majority opinion which held that "only 'a state interest of the
highest order' permits the state to penalize the publication of truthful
information").
49. Id.
321
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recorded in public.
The leading case to illustrate this point is Gill v. Hearst
Publishing Company."° In this case, a reporter secretly
photographed a couple sitting in a park engaging in an
amorous embrace for an article in Harper's Bazaar.1 The
magazine used the photograph in an article discussing how
love makes the world go round. 2 The couple wanted their
affections to remain private, as they thought they were alone
in a park, and sued under the privacy torts. 53 Justice Spence,
writing for the court, found that "[t]here could be no privacy
in that which is already public."54 The court held that if an
event is newsworthy, mirroring Dean Prosser's
newsworthiness standard, the court must perform a
balancing test between the right "to be let alone" and the "the
public interest in the dissemination of news and information
consistent with the democratic processes under.., freedom of
speech and of the press."55 In this case, the court found that
the article was newsworthy, 6  without providing a
satisfactory justification based on the facts. The majority
attempted to justify this analysis based on the Samuel
Warren and Justice Brandeis article, quoting that when "a
man's life has ceased to be private. .. [the] protection is to be
withdrawn." 7  However, having "pictures surreptitiously"
taken by newspapers was exactly the invasion of privacy the
Harvard luminaries warned against.58
In a stinging dissent, Justice Carter rejected the
majority's conclusion, arguing that "there is no news or
educational value whatsoever in the photograph" of the
couple. 9 Noting that the identity of the couple was not
necessary to advance any journalistic aspects of the story,
Justice Carter commented "there is no reason why the
publisher need invade the privacy of John and Jane Doe for
50. Gill, 253 P.2d 441.
51. Id. at 442.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 444 (citing Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)).
55. Id. at 443.
56. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Cal. 1953).
57. Id. at 443 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 215).
58. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 211.
59. Gill, 253 P.2d at 446 (Carter, J., dissenting).
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his purpose.""° Channeling the legacy of Samuel Warren and
Justice Brandeis, the dissenting opinion proclaimed, "These
private citizens, who desire to be left alone, should have and
enjoy a right of privacy so long as they do nothing which can
reasonably be said to have news value." 1 Distinguishing
between those who are genuinely in the public eye and those
who just want to be let alone, Justice Carter sought to have
the public disclosure of private facts tort "protect the right of
the 90% who do not desire publicity or notoriety and who may
be offended by publications such as that here involved."62
Displaying vast skepticism for the great deference the
majority granted to editors to determine newsworthiness, the
dissent found that the "[c]ourts should consider the effect of
such publication upon the sensibility of the ordinary private
citizen, and not upon the sensibility of those persons who seek
and enjoy publicity." 3  Justice Carter feared that "the
blameless exposure of a portion of a naked body of a man or
woman in a public place as the result of inefficient buttons,
hooks or other clothes-holding devices could be freely
photographed and widely published with complete
immunity."64 Today, we see that he was correct in light of
some of the provocative photographs Google Street View has
captured.65  Finally, Justice Carter drew a distinction
between what is viewable in public and what is viewable by
reproduction, by observing that what the couple "did in view
of a tiny fraction of the public, does not mean that they
consented to observation by the millions or readers of the
defendant's magazine."6' An opinion from the Second Circuit,
similar to Justice Carter's dissent, recognized that certain
aspects of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis's life in public were of
a private nature.67  The court held that intrusive
newsgathering techniques by a paparazzo may cause an
60. Id.
61. Id. at 447.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 446.
65. See infra Part II.A.
66. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
67. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting
Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E. 2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970)), affg in part,
rev'g in part, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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invasion of privacy, even when in public, finding that a
"person does not automatically make public everything he
does in a public place. '"68
Alas, since Justice Carter only wrote in dissent, and his
opinion has no value as precedent, most of the privacy cases
since Gill have adopted the majority's approach in finding
that privacy does not exist when something is in public and is
newsworthy. 69 Factoring in the Supreme Court's decision in
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,70 the right to privacy in public is
greatly weakened." The fact that privacy in public is
nonexistent under the current law is even more troubling
since technology has evolved to invade privacy in more
surreptitious and invasive ways than Warren and Justice
Brandeis could have ever imagined. Unbeknownst to him,
Justice Carter outlined in his dissent in Gill factors that can
define torts committed with future technologies: (1) people
68. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
69. See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922-24 (Cal. 1969). But cf.
Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477 (Ala. 1964) (holding, in a
case where a woman's underwear was photographed while a compressed air jet
in a fun-house blew up her skirt, that the photograph had "nothing of legitimate
news value .. .[and] disclose[d] nothing as to which the public is entitled to be
informed").
70. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that the publication of a
rape victim's name does not violate her privacy because the information was
available to the public, and finding that the government could only regulate
what a newspaper could publish in order to "further a state interest of the
highest order").
71. Id. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent noted that
the majority accorded "too little weight to B.J.F.'s side of the equation, and too
much to the other" and lamenting the obliteration of the tort of publication of
private facts, which was "one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the
20th century" but was now decimated. Id. at 542-43 (quoting Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (observing that "[sihort of homicide, [rape] is the
'ultimate violation of self " and that little could overcome this high threshold));
see Murphy, supra note 10, at 2388 (describing the privacy torts as "alive, but
on life support"); Jacqueline R. Rolfs, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning
of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1107, 1128
(observing that the public disclosure of private facts "tort can no longer be an
effective tool for protecting individual privacy"); Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and
the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1101
(1999) (noting that the disclosure tort exists "more 'in the books' than in
practice"); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 635 (2d ed. 2006). Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun
Microsystems eulogized this perceived death of privacy by saying, "[y]ou already
have zero privacy. Get over it." SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra, at
635.
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expect to be private when keeping to themselves, (2)
intruding upon this solitude is offensive, (3) the intrusion is
especially offensive when the image is reproduced, and (4)
there is no news value in incidental occurrences of average
people. These factors provide the foundation for the tort this
article refers to as the right to your digital identity. This tort
will provide a remedy when offensive images are recorded of
people without their permission and are indiscriminately
reproduced onto the Internet without any concern for
newsworthiness.
C. Privacy Protections Promote Free Speech and Expression
The key to understanding privacy is to understand how a
person chooses to change his speech and actions in varying
contexts.72 Inherent in each human being is a dichotomy
between what society sees of a person and what that person
knows about himself.73 In fact, the "the first etymological
meaning of the word 'person' was 'mask,' " as everyone exists
behind a faqade.74 Generally, when a person is in public, he
feels a cloak of anonymity. When no one is paying attention,
people tend to act free and uninhibited.75 People may feel
comfortable exhibiting certain behavior in front of one
audience when anonymity exists, but not in front of another
audience when privacy is lacking. A person may comfortably
and freely express himself when he has the perception of
anonymity, even if it is in front of a close group of friends
72. See, e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet:
A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989,
1041-43 (1995) (observing that "a photograph permits dissemination of an
image not just to a larger audience, but to different audiences than the subject
intended . .. [as] conduct which would be appropriate for one environment may
be inappropriate or embarrassing in another"). The concept of context is very
prominent throughout Supreme Court jurisprudence, including in criminal law.
See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994) ("Moreover,
whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by
viewing it in context.").
73. Philip Roth, In Defense of Intimacy: Milan Kundera's Private Lives,
VILLAGE VOICE, June 26, 1984, at 42 ("[Any man who was the same in both
public and intimate life would be a monster. He would be without spontaneity
in his private life and without responsibility in his public life.").
74. ALAN F. WESTIN, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals
for the 1970s, in PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967).
75. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,
432-33 (1980).
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because of the tight bonds within a social network,76 because
there is less fear that what is said or done can be used
against him to harm him. Anonymity allows people to act
with fewer inhibitions, as they have the ability to control the
risk of damage to their reputation.
The logical converse of this proposition is that when
someone feels they are being watched, they tend not to act as
free and uninhibited.77 When a person feels that others may
be looking, he will generally act differently.78 Persistently
recording a person and broadcasting the images out of context
chills an individual's ability to freely express himself. If a
person knows, or even is apprehensive that he is being
photographed by omniveillance, his behavior will be even
further modified because the observation will be indelibly
recorded forever.79 Recently, a German study analyzing how
surveillance affects a citizen's behavior found that "[p]eople
under surveillance behave differently than people who are not
monitored-differently than free people."8  Therefore,
understanding the dynamic of people's perception of
anonymity in public is critical for promoting positive
uninhibited expressions.
Privacy and free speech can be thought of as two sides of
the same coin. They are complementary, rather than
competing, interests.8 1 When properly balanced, they yield
76. See infra Part III.C.
77. Hubert H. Humphrey, Foreword to EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS,
at viii (1967) ("We act differently if we believe we are being observed. If we can
never be sure whether or not we are being watched and listened to, all our
actions will be altered and our very character will change.").
78. See JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE: LOST BOUNDARIES OF THE SELF 174 (1979) (explaining that in public,
individuals strive to meet the expectations of society).
79. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD 186 (2004) (noting that
people generally try to adopt the " 'middle region' behavior in public: a blend of
the formal front stage, and the informal back stage, with a bias towards self-
conscious informality").
80. Kreativrauschen, http://www.kreativrauschen.com/blog/200806/04/data-
retention-effectively-changes-the-behavior-of-citizens-in-germany (June 2008).
Although this study was performed on German citizens, and focused on
government and not private surveillance, id., the results support this article's
thesis that people moderate, modify, and abstain from certain behaviors when
they are being monitored.
81. See also Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy,
71 WASH. L. REV. 683, 723 (1996) ("[T]he right to privacy and the First
Amendment both serve the same interest in individual autonomy.").
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optimal results. To further explore this, it is necessary to
visualize two extremes. In a world with no privacy
protections and unrestricted free speech rights, where
everything can be known about everyone, free expression
would suffer. A person would not want to express his true
thoughts for fear of embarrassment, ridicule, humiliation, or
retribution. 2 This fear would result in the ultimate chilling
of speech.
However, in an alternate universe with absolute privacy
rights and no free speech, there would be a similar outcome.
A person would not be able to express his true thoughts, and
would have to keep all of his emotions to himself. This
restraint would also result in the ultimate chilling of speech.
Therefore, rather than existing as competing interests,
privacy and free speech complement one another when
properly balanced to provide a symmetry to optimize people's
desire to express themselves, and at the same time,
minimizes any apprehension that such an expression may
cause. Without privacy, people do not comfortably speak
candidly." Without free speech, people cannot speak
candidly. For this reason, society should strive to achieve a
dynamic equilibrium between free speech and privacy that
can promote the optimal level of expression.
II. OMNIVEILLANCE
Omniveillance is briefly defined as omnipresent,
omniscient, digital surveillance in public, broadcasted
indiscriminately throughout the Internet, without any
concern for newsworthiness. It is debatable whether
omniveillance exists today, but it is inevitable that it will
exist in the near future. Today, one of the neophytes in this
emerging field is Google Street View. By dispatching a fleet
of surveillance vehicles throughout the country that takes
82. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 72 ("Without privacy, people might
experience significant unease at everything they do, constantly wondering how
others might interpret their actions. Innocent behavior might appear
suspicious out of context.").
83. See, e.g., id. at 4, 130 ("As social reputation-shaping practices such as
gossip and shaming migrate to the Internet, they are being transformed in
significant ways. Information that was once scattered, forgettable, and
localized is becoming permanent and searchable. Ironically, the free flow of
information threatens to undermine our freedom in the future.").
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high resolution photographs of everyone in public, and
reproducing these virtual panoramas onto the Internet,
Google has taken the first steps towards omniveillance.
Although today's technology may seem relatively benign, the
current progression of this phenomenon trends towards
complete and pervasive surveillance. An Orwellian future of
omniveillance could lead to the evisceration of privacy in
public.
A. Google Street View Can See You
Google is the leading Internet search provider for most of
the world, and handles nearly seventy percent of Internet
searches in America.84 The popular site has become so
embedded in American culture that the verb "google" has
become synonymous with search and has even been added to
popular dictionaries.8 5 The ubiquity and prevalence of Google
in our culture was epitomized when Presidential nominee
John McCain admitted that he would research on Google to
vet Vice Presidential candidates.8 6 In addition to Internet
search, Google has also entered the geospatial imaging
service with Google Maps, by providing free detailed maps
and satellite imagery to the public.8 " In late May of 2007,
Google introduced a new addition to Google Maps called
Street View. 8 This new feature allows users to obtain a
ground level panoramic view of New York, San Francisco, Las
Vegas, Miami, and other U.S. cities. 9
Google and a company called Immersive Media conducted
84. Stephen Shankland, Google's U.S. Search Share Nears 70 Percent,
CNET, July 15, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023-3-9991866-
93.html?tag=nefd.top.
85. Scott D. Harris, Dictionary Adds Verb: To Google, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, July 7, 2006, at Al.
86. Jeff Mason, McCain Says Using Google to Vet VP Candidates, REUTERS,
June 9, 2008, http://reuters.com/article/internetnews/idUSN0926840220080609.
87. Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
Although Google Street View is not the only provider of this type of service, as
Yahoo!, Microsoft, and others have proposed similar services, it is by far the
most prominent and sophisticated. Therefore, this article will primarily focus
on Google's offerings. Google Earth has also been used to map movement of
refugees around the world. Google Earth Maps Refugee Crises, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 8, 2008,
http://www.baynews9.com/content/36/2008/4/8/338441.html.
88. Jesse Leavenworth, WEBCAMMED!; Google Takes Man on the Street to
New Places, HOUS. CHRON., July 1, 2007, § Star, at 5.
89. Id.
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the digital survey of these cities.9" Dispatching a fleet of
nondescript and unmarked vehicles equipped with a
clandestine panoramic surveillance camera, Google has been
creeping through the streets of major American cities since
2005 and recording everything in sight. 91 Once the images
are recorded, Google broadcasts the photographs onto an
easily accessible Internet site that stitches the images
together into a virtual landscape that allows a person to view
the street scene as if he were there.92 Street View allows you
to zoom in and out, and spin around in a 360-degree camera
angle to see precise details. These recorded images offer
unprecedented clarity, allowing users to see people's faces,
license plates, and even a cat sitting on a windowsill through
open curtains. 94  Recently, Google has announced plans to
expand Street View to Canada95 and Australia,96 and has
begun taking pictures in Paris,97  Milan,98  the United
Kingdom, 99  New Zealand, °°  and Switzerland.'0 ' The
90. Id.
91. It is not certain how recently these photographs have been taken, or
how often they will be updated. The news ticker in Times Square flashed a
headline that former Green Bay Packers quarterback Brett Favre had just
thrown his 400th touchdown. Based on this fact, Google photographed
Manhattan on approximately September 23, 2006.
92. Leavenworth, supra note 88.
93. See Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
94. Posting of Ryan Singel, to Wired Blog Network,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/05/request for-urb.html (May 30, 2007,
4:31:30 PST).
95. David Ljunggren, Google Eyes Canada Rollout of Discreet Street View,
REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUSN24306969200709
24.
96. Asher Moses, Google's Candid Camera Snaps Australia, THE AGE
(Austl.), Nov. 23, 2007, http://www.theage.com.au/news/web/googles-candid-
camera-snaps-australia/2007/11/23/1195753275851.html. Interestingly, shortly
after Google Street View was announced in Australia, The Australian (a
newspaper) requested addresses of Google employees living in Australia, so the
paper could publish pictures of their homes. Exhibiting somewhat of a double
standard, Google refused. Anthony Klan, Google Execs Reveal Double
Standards, AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 12, 2008,
http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23535299-15306,00.html.
97. Peter Sayer, Google Takes Street View Snaps in Paris; Lawsuits May
Follow, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 9, 2008,
http://www.thestandard.com/news/2008/05/09/google-takes-street-view-snaps-
paris-lawsuits-may-follow.
98. Posting of Stephen Shankland to CNET News Blog,
http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9924711-7.html (Apr. 21, 2008, 11:24 PDT).
99. Google Faces 'Street View Block', BBC, July 4, 2008,
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European Union Data Protection Working Party has already
put Google on notice that this product would violate
European privacy law, noting that "[m]aking pictures
everywhere is certainly going to create some problems." °2
Many civil libertarians and electronic privacy advocates
were outraged at this new service. 103 Some people have been
caught in rather embarrassing positions, as Street View has
photographed a man wearing a wedding ring walking out of a
gentlemen's club in broad daylight, 10 4 a man relieving himself
in an alley in San Diego, 0 5 two women sunbathing near
Stanford University, 10 6 a close-up of a scantily clad woman, 0 7
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7488524.stm.
100. Tom Pullar-Strecker, Google's Street View in NZ Soon, STUFF.CO.NZ,
Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/4642693a28.html.
101. Posting of Owen Thomas to Valleywag,
http://valleywag.com/357517/sergey-stymied-prius-doesnt-work-for-google-
street-view (Feb. 19, 2008, 13:28).
102. Mark John, EU Says Google Map Images Could Be a Problem, REUTERS,
May 15, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSL1593011920080515?feedT
ype=RSS&feedName=technologyNews&rpc=22&sp=true.
103. See CBS Evening News, Google's New Street View Being Criticized as an
Invasion of Privacy (CBS news broadcast June 11, 2007) (reporting that
although Street View has not done "anything illegal here," it makes people feel
"icky and uncomfortable" and that "[a]lthough we all recognize the risk that we
might be watched or photographed moving about in public, we all assume some
level of anonymity"); Catharine Holahan, Google Is Watching You, BUS. WK.
ONLINE, June 25, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2007/tc20070622 338015.h
tm; Leavenworth, supra note 88 ("There's a big difference between a person
taking a photo on the street and the Internet's largest corporation swallowing
up all the data that it can capture."); Feng Zeng Kun, Street View Zooms in on
Privacy Issues, THE STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 10, 2007,
http://www.asiaone.com/print/digital/features/story/Alstory2007O7l1-
17954.html ("Being outed as a smoker is a fairly mild embarrassment ... but
what if someone was walking out of an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting?").
104. Posting of Stan Schroeder to Mashable,
http://mashable.com/2007/05/31/top-15-google-street-view-sightings/ (May 31,
2007, 11:05 PDT).
105. News.com.au, Gallery: The Best of Google Street View,
http://www.news.com.au/technology/gallery/0,25793,5031914-5007151-
13,00.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
106. Google Sightseeing, Half Naked Sunbathing Girls on Google Street
View, May 31, 2007, http://googlesightseeing.com/2007/05/31/half-naked-
sunbathing-girls-on-google-street-view/.
107. News.com.au, Gallery: The Best of Google Street View,
http://www.news.com.au/technology/gallery/0,25793,5031914-5007151-4,00.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
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young girls in bathing suits outside a car wash in Dallas,108 a
gIrl flashing the Street View camera, 10 9  a woman's
undergarments exposed while leaning into a car,110 a
gentleman who was caught putting his fingers where they
probably should not have been,"' a man creeping into the
shadows of an adult book store," a possible drug deal in
Chicago, 1 3 a teen aiming a gun at a young child," 4 a boy
falling off of his bicycle,"' a car caught on fire," 6 and even a
reflection of a radar gun showing that the Google
surveillance-mobile was speeding in a school zone." 7
Recently, a couple in Pittsburgh filed suit against Google for
photographing their home, alleging a violation of their
privacy.11 The case is currently pending before the Western
District of Pennsylvania, and Google has filed a motion to
dismiss." 9
B. Omniveillance Defined
It is important to distinguish Street View from previous
108. News.com.au, Gallery: The Best of Google Street View,
http://www.news.com.au/technology/gallery/0,25793,50 3 19 14-5 00 7 151-
10,00.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
109. Posting of Nick Denton to Gawker, http://gawker.com/5009185/girl-
flashes-google-mapmakers-cameras (May 15, 2008, 13:53 EST).
110. Google Street View Sightings, Thong Girl on Google Street View
Sightings, http://www.gstreetsightings.com/girls/thong-girl-on-google-street-
view-sightings/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
111. Photobucket,
http://i28.photobucket.com/albums/c201/DIEmfDIE50/picker.jpg (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008).
112. Posting of Philipp Lenssen to Google Blogoscoped,
http://blogoscoped.com/archive/2007-06-03-n48.html (June 3, 2007).
113. Posting of Nick Denton to Gawker, http://gawker.conV5004469/a-drug-
deal-caught-from-every-angle (Mar. 24, 2008, 13:32 EST).
114. Posting of Nick Douglas to Gawker, http://gawker.com/392059/google-
maps-catches-chicago-kid-about-to-shoot-someone (May 20, 2008, 12:24 EST).
115. News.com.au, Gallery: The Best of Google Street View,
http://www.news.com.au/technology/gallery/0,25793,503191 4-500 7 151-
7,00.html.
116. News.com.au, Gallery: The Best of Google Street View,
http://www.news.com.au/technology/gallery/0,25793,5031914-5007151,00.html.
117. Posting of Stan Schroeder to Mashable,
http://mashable.com/2007/05/31/top-15-google-street-view-sightings/ (May 31,
2007, 11:05 PDT).
118. Zusha Elinson, Boring Couple Sues Google over Street View, LAW.COM,
Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1207305794776.
119. Google: "Complete Privacy Does Not Exist," THE SMOKING GuN, July 30,
2008, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/2008/0730081google1.html.
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iterations of public recording that lack many of the
distinguishing characteristics that make this new
phenomenon such a deep invasion into society's privacy.
Banks, hotels, and retail stores frequently use surveillance
cameras to video-record customers for security reasons.
Companies such as EarthCam already provide twenty-four
hour Internet cameras in popular public locations that
rebroadcast images onto the Internet for anyone to view. 2 °
More recently, average people attempt to become paparazzi
with their digital cameras and cellular phone cameras, by
posting photographs and videos of public occurrences onto the
Internet with services like Flikr (a popular photo sharing web
site), YouTube (a popular video sharing web site), and even
user-generated news web sites.' 2 ' New York City now allows
citizens to upload amateur videos or photographs of potential
crimes to the police department's web site. 122 A new service
known as geotagging, featured on the Apple iPhone 3G,
automatically records the latitude and longitude coordinates
wherever a photograph is taken. 23  This mild form of
omniveillance allows a user to quickly photograph a specific
event and upload the recording onto the Internet so that the
location where the photograph was taken becomes linked to
that picture.
As invasive as all of these recordings are, they are easily
distinguished from Street View. First, these monitoring
regimes are extremely limited in scope. The cameras are
strewn out sparsely throughout specific areas. Second, the
120. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 163; see also James Vlahos, Welcome to the
Panopticon; High-Tech Surveillance Isn't Just for Secretive Government
Agencies Anymore. Artificially Intelligent Cameras Will Soon Be Watching Us
Almost Everywhere, from the Sidewalk to the Supermarket, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Jan. 2008, at 64, available at
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military-law/4236865.html.
121. SOLOVE, supra note 12 at 164; see also Agence France-Presse,
NowPublic News Site Buys Truemors Rumor Website, BREITBART.COM, July 10,
2008,
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=080710130330.plrpxko5&showarticle
=1.
122. Deborah Jian Lee, NYPD Calls on Citizens for Amateur Video Evidence,
REUTERS, July 31, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticnews/idUSN3136650420080731.
123. Posting of Charlie Sorrell to Wired Blog Network,
http://blog.wired.com/gadgets/2008105/iphone-20-to-in.html (May 23, 2008,
4:44:24 PST).
332 [Vol:49
2009] THE RIGHT TO YOUR DIGITAL IDENTITY
recordings are not easily accessible. These providers do not
store or archive images, but rather produce a new image over
regular intervals. In addition, private businesses seldom
make their recordings available to the general public.
Finally, the recordings have extremely limited usability.
These services provide a single point of view, with relatively
crude image clarity.
As distinguished from previous forms of public
monitoring, this new form of surveillance will be
omnipresent, as it can record vast areas of space over a very
small period of time. It provides the users of this system with
omniscience to know everything happening in a specific
location at a specific time. Furthermore, this information will
be indefinitely retained, and easily accessible. When future
versions of this technology is properly implemented, it will be
possible to enter a time, date, and location, and witness what
happened at that moment as if you were there. It is a virtual
time machine. In addition, using facial recognition
technology, it will even be possible to search for a particular
person's location at any given recorded moment. Although
Street View is currently only limited to urban metropolises,
companies such as Everyscape seek to expand digital
surveillance to rural locations such as ski-resorts, beaches,
and other out-of-the-way places.124  Another friendly
neighborhood surveillance provider called Earthmine is
developing technology that can record all stores, restaurants,
and other locations in public.125 No place would be safe from
the unblinking eye of omniveillance.
Another key distinction between previous technologies
and omniveillance is that images are now broadcasted
throughout multiple electronic media without any concern for
newsworthiness. The most insignificant, inconsequential,
and ostensibly private facts can be instantly littered all over
the information superhighway. Traditional media editors
were limited by space as to how much information could be
reproduced. Specifically, an editor would be constrained by
124. Robert Weisman, Get Ready for Your Close-Up, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11,
2007, at Al, available at
http://www.boston.comfbusiness/technology/articles/2007/12/1 1/get-ready-for-yo
ur_closeup/.
125. See Rafe Needleman, Sneak Peek: Earthmine's Street View, CNET
NEWS, June 26, 2007, http://www.webware.com/8301-1-109-9735721-2.html.
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the amount of space and time available, whether it was the
number of minutes on the evening newscast, or the amount of
columns in a newspaper. As a result, only a certain amount
of information about people involved with certain events
could possibly have been thrust into the spotlight.
Traditionally, when courts deferred to an editor to help
determine whether reproduction was appropriate, 26 the judge
could reasonably rely on the economics of the media as a
check on what could be published and as a limitation on
invasions of privacy. 127 However, with omniveillance, no such
editorial board exists. Rather, high-capacity hard drives and
blazing-fast Internet servers128 break free content providers
from the traditional chains of columns in a newspaper or
seconds in a television spot. The essence of omniveillance-
instantaneous worldwide distribution, indefinite retention,
and ease of access-rewards content providers for posting the
maximum amount of information possible, without any
restrictions. An anonymous posting to the Boing Boing web
log about Street View accurately describes the quandary that
is omniveillance: "Cameras aren't new, maps aren't new, the
Internet isn't new, nor is Google or Microsoft. So why does
this feel so freshly creepy to so many?"1 29  This question is
best answered by looking towards the near future of
omniveillance.
126. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989).
127. See, e.g., Heath v. Playboy Enter's, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) ("What is newsworthy is primarily a function of the publisher, not the
courts."); Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a
Definition of "Journalist" in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 437 (1999) (noting
that judges applying the "Leave-it-to-the-Press Model" grant deference to the
decisions of editors to determine what is newsworthy). But see Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (imposing the high standard that news
"ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and
becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake"
based on the community's standards rather than adopting a leave-it-to-the-
press approach); Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct.
App. 1984) ("[T]he paramount test of newsworthiness is whether the matter is
of legitimate public interest which in turn must be determined according to the
community mores.").
128. See Jonathan Leake, Coming Soon: Superfast Internet, TIMES ONLINE
(London), Apr. 6, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/science/article3689881.ece.
129. Steve Johnson, Street View: The Creepy Side of Google, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, June 15, 2007, at 1.
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C. The Near Future of Omniveillance
Although Google is extremely tight-lipped about the
future of its search technology, combining various statements
made by its officers with a look at the state of the art of
emerging technology provides an eerie glimpse into the not-
so-distant future of omniveillance. According to Tim Berners-
Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, the future of the
Internet will be what he terms the "semantic web," where all
aspects of a person's life are intricately connected online.13°
On the semantic web, if a person forgot where he made a
purchase, he would be able to connect his bank statement
with his calendar with his photo album, and the technology
would not only tell him what he bought and when he bought
it, but it would be able to show him a snapshot taken
contemporaneously with the purchase to show him where he
made the purchase. 13' Berners-Lee finds that this future will
be about "creating a seamless web of all the data in your
life."1' 32
Google has already begun its form of a semantic web in
the city of Nanaimo, British Columbia, Canada.133 The city
has provided Google with detailed municipal information
about their fire services, buildings, property lines, utilities,
permit information, zoning history, garbage collection
schedule, and even the location of cemetery plots. 3 4 In turn,
Google incorporated all of this information into its Google
Earth geospatial imaging system, and now allows residents to
instantly see when the home garbage delivery will occur, how
their property is zoned, and even where the closest fire truck
is. "'35 Google also allows a user to type in any address and
read stories about news events occurring in that locale,136 as
well as view photos, videos, real estate listings, and other
130. Jonathan Richards, Google Could Be Superseded, Says Web Inventor,
TIMES ONLINE (London), Mar. 12, 2008,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech-andweb/article3532832.ece.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Rob Shaw, How Google Earth Ate Our Town, TIME, Mar. 10, 2008,
http://www.time.con/time/world/article/0,8599,1720932,00.html.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Posting of Stephen Shankland to CNET News Blog,
http://www.news.com/8301-10784 3-9913172-7.html?tag=nefd.top (Apr. 7, 2008,
13:22 PDT).
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content associated with that geographic area.13 7  This
aggregation of information that closely touches everyone's
lives is a first step towards a semantic web. 138
In an interview conducted by the Financial Times,
Google CEO Eric Schmidt admitted the company's future goal
is to organize people's daily lives.1 9  Specifically, Schmidt
augured that one day "users [will] . . . be able to ask the
question such as 'What shall I do tomorrow?' and 'What job
shall I take?' " and Google would be able to answer those
questions.' 40  Udi Manber, Google's Vice President of
Engineering in charge of Google Search, reaffirmed this
sentiment, and posited that Google has "to understand as
much as we can user intent and give [users] the answer they
need."14 ' Mr. Schmidt acknowledged that the primary
obstacle to this goal is not the technology, but the lack of
information Google possesses about people.' Talking to
journalists in London, Mr. Schmidt stated, "We cannot even
answer the most basic questions because we don't know
137. Posting of Elinor Mills to CNET News Blog, http://www.news.com/8301-
10784_.3-9944572-7.html (May 14, 2008, 15:47 PDT).
138. Christine Evans-Pughe, Our Surveillance Society Goes Online,
GUARDIAN (London), May 8, 2008, at 3, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/may/08/privacy.internet ("When the
[I]nternet goes fully semantic-and machines can read and understand all those
scattered documents rather than just storing them-the potential for computers
to define us, undermine our privacy and demarcate our freedom of action will be
even greater.").
139. Caroline Daniel & Maija Palmer, Google's Goal: To Organise Your Daily
Life, FIN. TIMES (London), May 22, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/c3e49548-088e-I ldc-bl le-000b5df10621.html; see
also Rhys Blakely, Google to Tackle Wikipedia with New Knowledge Service,
TIMES ONLINE (London), Dec. 15, 2007,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/technology/articl
e3054287.ece (reporting that soon Google will launch a new online encyclopedia
which will aggregate information about every topic in the world, competing with
Wikipedia); Weisman, supra note 124 ("As Google gets closer and closer to its
stated goal of indexing all the world's information, more and more [privacy]
issues arise.").
140. Daniel & Palmer, supra note 139.
141. Posting of Stephen Shankland to CNET News Blog,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9972034-7.html?tag=nefd.top (June 18,
2008, 12:31 PDT).
142. Daniel & Palmer, supra note 139; see also JOHN BATrELLE, THE
SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIvALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND
TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 252 (2005) ("As every engineer in the search field
loves to tell you, search is at best 5 percent solved-we're not even in the double
digitals of its potential.").
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enough about you. That is the most important aspect of
Google's expansion.""'
Mr. Schmidt acknowledged that Google is still in the
early stages of gathering the information it has, and that
algorithms can only be improved by better personalization.'"
What Mr. Schmidt did not mention was how this
personalization, that is, the collection of personal information,
would take place. Google's experiment in Nanaimo, British
Columbia shows how it can organize the aggregation of this
data from the real world. If Google really plans on telling a
person what to do or which job to take, information must be
gathered from sources beyond those on the Internet-namely
the real world.'45 And that's where Google Street View can
come in.
The present iteration of Street View is technologically
impotent and benign with respect to gathering information
about people. Using Street View, currently, the only way to
gather information about people is by typing in an address
and zooming around until a user sees something interesting.
Google's Vice President in Charge of Search lamented the
Internet's current ability to understand images based on tags
around it, but forecasted that in the future, computers will be
able to discern the contents of a picture.'46
With the advent of photo-sharing Internet sites like
Flikr, MySpace, and Facebook, people can now upload
143. Daniel & Palmer, supra note 139.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., ALBERT-LASZLo BARABASI, LINKED 164-65 (2002) (noting that
Google only searches the outer layer of the Web, and the majority of content is
still waiting to be discovered).
146. Posting of Stephen Shankland to CNET News Blog,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9960259-7.html?tag=nefd.lede (June 5,
2008, 4:00 PDT). When asked about technology's ability to understand the
contents of an image, Google's vice president in charge of search answered:
The typical question people pose-'Can you tell that's a tree?'--I think
that's the wrong question. We can tell that's a tree with the text
[surrounding it]. We'll get you good pictures of trees. The problem is
you want to look at the Hearst Building with the sign from the right
angle with the sun up above. That's the kind of question that's very
hard to tell, because the image doesn't say it's the Hearst Building and
whether the sun is shining. You're getting into a lot of depth there.
That's going to require some combination of some image processing and
some information about it. The metadata around the image is going to
get more important.
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photographs and "tag" a specific person's identity in the photo
with metadata, as if they were captioning it in a scrapbook
(i.e., John Doe is the third person on the left). Although
currently the tagging process must be done manually, new
facial recognition such as Google's Picasa system utilizes
artificial intelligence computers to automatically index and
tag the subjects of photographs. 4 7 Software like Polar Rose is
capable of scanning the entire World Wide Web, matching
faces with previously tagged photos based on similarities in
biometric features, and automatically tagging the photo with
the person's identity. 148 Berners-Lee mentions tagging as one
of the key prerequisites to the semantic web. 149
Once an image is tagged, these captions can be searched
and indexed like any other document on the Internet. As a
result of this emerging image-analysis technology, a search
engine like Google can easily correlate a person's face with his
name, contact information, personal preferences, friends, and
any of his personal information located on the Internet. In
fact, Google's Director of Product Management, R.J. Pittman,
"said that Google is developing visual crawling software that
can be used for facial recognition and scene analysis. " 1°
Applied to Street View, this future technology can be
combined with tagging and advanced image search
capabilities to identify anyone who is recorded by
omniveillance.
An example of such a bridge between a person's online
presence and the real world takes the form of new smart
billboards, a preview of omniveillant technologies to come. A
French company called Quividi has installed billboards in
New York City equipped with cameras and powerful
computers. 151 By analyzing the facial characteristics of a
147. http://picasa.google.com/support'bin/answer.py?answer=93973&topic=
14605 (indicating that "[aifter you enable name tags, Picasa Web Albums will
look for similar faces in your photo collection" and tag them).
148. Id.; see also Harry Lewis, Op-Ed, How Facebook Spells the End of
Privacy, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2008, at All, available at
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial-opinion/oped/articles/2008/06/14/ho
w_facebook-spells theendof privacy/ (editorializing that when Polar Rose is
able to tag pictures on the Internet, people's personal information could wind up
in "some great database").
149. Jonathan Richards, supra note 130.
150. Posting of Dan Farber to CNET News Blog, http://news.cnet.com/8301-
10784_3-9982448-7.html?tag=nefd.riv (July 1, 2008, 14:58 EST).
151. Stephanie Clifford, Billboards that Look Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
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person walking in front of the camera (e.g., "cheekbone height
and the distance between the nose and the chin"), the
billboard can roughly determine the age and gender of a
passerby.152  Based on this profile, the billboard, equipped
with a large flat-screen television, delivers advertisements
specifically targeted to the particular demographic.153 The
goal of this technology is "to tailor a digital display to the
person standing in front of it-to show one advertisement to a
middle-aged white woman, for example, and a different one to
a teenage Asian boy."154
Imagine an alternative business model in an
omniveillant society, wherein these cameras do not simply
analyze the facial features of a promenading consumer, but
rather snap a photo, and search tagged images on the
Internet to ascertain the identity of the person. With this
technique, the billboard does not simply know the person's
age or gender, but can ascertain what online stores the
person frequents, who the person's friends are, and volumes
of other personal information. An advertiser's dream, indeed!
Imagine further that the billboard recorded how long a person
stared at the billboard, in order to gauge his interest at a
particular advertisement, or even whether a person began
discussing the billboard with a fellow spectator. Unassuming
spectators would be unknowingly conscripted into serving as
a veritable Nielsen rating focus group. This information
could be further disseminated throughout the Internet to
create a profile about a person's likes, dislikes, and
preferences. The information gleaned from these billboards
could serve as a perfect conduit for an omniveiller to gather
more information about people from the real world, in order
to tell them things like " '[wihat shall [they] do tomorrow'" or
"'[w]hat job [should they] take.' "155
Social-networking Internet site Facebook announced that
it is opening up user profiles to search engines like Google
2008, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2O08/O5/31business/media/3 1billboard.html?ref=opinio
n.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Daniel & Palmer, supra note 139.
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using a technology called Facebook Connect. 156  Facebook's
Senior Platform Manager commented, "We believe the next
evolution of data portability is about much more than data.
It's about giving users the ability to take their identity and
friends with them around the Web."15 7 Social networking
giant Myspace also announced its "data availability" project
that opens up profile data to the entire Internet.58  This
access will enable search engines to search the personal
information of millions of Americans.
Although the current version of Street View is limited to
pre-recorded still photographs, future technology will allow
real-time streaming video feeds of everything occurring in
public. Immersive Media, the company that provides the
surveillance apparatus for Google, has not stopped its
research at still photographs. Currently in its laboratories it
is developing what it calls "Immersive 3600 Video" or
"Spherical Video." 1 9 Rather than just taking still shots of
specific locations, the technology can record interactive and
navigable 360-degree videos.16 0 This capability allows a user
to watch a video from multiple camera angles. 16' These
omens ominously bear on the value of Street View, and create
a scary image of what Google could do. Because there is no
viable right to privacy in public, and because Google seeks to
create a visual map of the planet, there is nothing preventing
Google or any other company from installing such video
cameras with tagging capabilities on the rooftops of private
business throughout America. This vision of the future poses
serious issues and conjures up an Orwellian nightmare. 162
If a live video feed of every action a person takes is
recorded and broadcasted over the Internet, facial recognition
technology, similar to Polar Rose, can be applied. The effect
156. Posting of Caroline McCarthy to CNET News Blog,
http://www.news.com/8301-13577-3-9940166-36.html (May 9, 2008, 12:32 PDT).
157. Id.
158. Posting of Caroline McCarthy to CNET News Blog,
http://www.news.com/8301-13577_3-9939286-36.html (May 8, 2008, 10:04 PDT).
159. See Immersive Media, http://demos.immersivemedia.com/ (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008).
160. Posting of Frank Taylor to Google Earth Blog,
http://gearthblog.com/blog/archives/2007/05/technology-behind-go.html (May
31, 2007, 9:42).
161. Id.
162. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (2d ed. 1982).
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will be that the technology could instantly and automatically
tag every person in a city. At any given moment, these
cameras would know what stores a person goes to, what
doctors a person visits, what activities a person engages in,
and even if someone breaks the law. In fact, recent facial-
recognition technology can diagnose various genetic disorders
based on certain characteristics in a person's face.6 3 This
technology can even be used to identify people's diseases,
which could be the ultimate violation of privacy."M In light of
the fact that Google and others now allow people to store
their medical information in a centralized location, if this
most confidential data was ever released onto the Internet,
people's most intimate health concerns could be exploited by
omniveillance.'65 Currently, people who seek to stay out of
the limelight can avoid using a computer, abstain from
posting to blogs, and miss out on all of the fun of social
networking. However, under this new regime, you can't run;
you can't hide; there is no escape.
D. The Need for a Tort to Remedy Omniveillance
While a government-surveillance database would be
constitutionally limited for local and national security
purposes, a private sector database used for commercial
purposes would be virtually unfettered. Google, or any other
omniveiller, could create an expansive database of what a
person does online, and what the person does while away
from the computer with no legal repercussions. This presents
societal problems, as broadcasting a person's private behavior
may damage his public reputation and prevent an
opportunity for him to grow and reform. Recording people in
163. Fiona Macrae, Facial Scans Could Reveal Genetic Disorders, DAILY
MAIL (London), Sept. 10, 2007, at 24, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articlesfhealth/healthmain.html?inarticl
e id=480952&in pageid= 1774&in_a_source=.
164. Id. In another area of privacy concern, Google has begun aggregating
people's health and medical records. Steve Lohr, Warning on Storage of Health
Records, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/business/17record.html?_r=3&adxnnl=l&or
ef=slogin&ref=business&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=1210707108-
8qlST4ZevSQFLmeztcidYg.
165. Rachel Melz, Google Makes Health Service Publicly Available, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 19, 2008,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dwsbus/ptech/stories/05-21_08dnbus
Health. 1059538d.html.
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public also places limitations on free expression because the
inability to communicate privately chills expression. Finally,
such recordings can even create safety issues, as those with
nefarious ends can easily learn people's most intimate,
unguarded, and vulnerable behaviors. Further, even if
Google or any other company adopts a stringent privacy
policy, there are substantial risks to aggregating so much
personal information in a single repository-especially in
light of computer hackers who might be able to expropriate
this information.'66 This article does not seek to impugn
Google or any other company. The point that must be
stressed is the risk inherent in allowing any entity the ability
to collect so much information, unfettered by any concerns for
privacy. If said information falls into the wrong hands,
America's conceptions of privacy can be greatly damaged, if
not destroyed.
1. Threat to Reputation
One of the greatest threats that a lack of privacy
protections in public places poses is the potential to damage a
reputation. 161 Personal information that is taken out of
context can often lead to unfair judgments that can prevent
learning more about a person's character. 6 8 When a person
chooses to share intimate information with a select group of
people, he is able to prevent common misjudgments by
providing context for his behavior. 169 If a person engages in
166. See Posting of Elinor Mills to CNET News Blog,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9957872-7.html?tag=nefd.top (June 2, 2008,
18:18 PDT) (discussing security vulnerabilities on the Google web page).
167. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
130 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1765) ("The security of his reputation or good
name from the arts of detraction and slander, are rights to which every man is
intitled [sic], by reason and natural justice; since without these it is impossible
to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right."); WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 2, sc. 3 ("Reputation, reputation, reputation! 0, I
have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of my self and what
remains is bestial.").
168. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 31 ("Our freedom, in short, depends upon how
others in society judge us."); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less:
Justifying Privacy Protections against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1034
(2003).
169. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY
IN AMERICA 8-9 (2000) ("When intimate personal information circulates among
a small group of people who know us well, its significance can be weighed
against other aspects of our personality and character. By contrast, when
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an activity that is misunderstood within a circle of friends, he
generally will have a chance to explain what happened. 170 If
the information is widely disseminated, the person will have
no such opportunity.
This dynamic greatly impacted the reputation of Chief
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge Kozinski's family maintained a personal Internet
server containing certain questionably obscene photographs
that they intended only to be viewed by close
acquaintances.' 7 1 While Judge Kozinski was hearing an
obscenity trial, a media reporter revealed the existence of
these images.172 After his impartiality was challenged, Judge
Kozinski recused himself and requested an investigation into
his performance. 7 3 The Judge knew the pictures were on his
Internet server, but he thought they were only for
consumption of an audience limited to his friends and
family. 17
4
This situation differs from omniveillance in that the
pictures on the personal server were not of the Judge, yet
they nonetheless exemplify an aspect of his character, which
in effect is a telling portrait of his persona. A judge's private
information on the Internet, viewed by an unintended
audience and taken out of context, tarnished the reputation of
a venerated and respected jurist. An omniveillance recording
of an unsuspecting person engaging in a societal taboo could
have similarly dangerous effects to a person's reputation.
In the context of omniveillance, where an image captured
of a person engaging in an activity may easily be taken out of
context, such a chance to explain the photograph is not a
initiate information is removed from its original context and revealed to
strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the basis of our most
embarrassing, and therefore most memorable tastes and preferences.").
170. Id.; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Inquiry, 79 WASH. L. REV.
119, 154-55 (2004) ("It is crucial to know the context-who is gathering the
information, who is analyzing it, who is disseminating it and to whom, the
nature of the information, the relationships among the parties, and even larger
institutional and social circumstances.").
171. See Nissenbaum, supra note 170. See generally Editorial, Nothing Is
Private, THE SEATTLE TIMES, June 15, 2008, at B8, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2004478298-pornedl5.
html.
172. See Nissenbaum, supra note 170.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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possibility, as the subject might not have even been aware he
was recorded.' According to privacy scholar Professor
Daniel Solove, "[pirivacy encourages uninhibited speech by
enabling individuals to direct frank communications to those
people they trust and who will not cause them harm because
of what they say."'76
As Professor Solove astutely noted, the virtue of knowing
less shows that "[allthough more information about a person
might help enrich our understanding of that person, it might
also lead us astray, since we often lack the whole story."'77
For example, if a wife saw an image of her husband walking
out of an adult bookstore, there could be an immediate rush
to judgment. Without jumping to any conclusions, the
accused husband could have needed to urgently use the
bathroom, might have been waiting to pick someone up, or
maybe was lost. Nonetheless, once his privacy is violated,
most people do not get a second chance to rectify these
concerns. When this kind of information is revealed to
strangers, prejudice and misjudgments abound. 178
Recording, broadcasting, and archiving a person's actions
may deny him the opportunity to grow and reform. 79 Like an
elephant, the Internet never forgets.' Once an image is
released, even if it is removed from a web site, it will
invariably be stored forever elsewhere.' 8 ' For example, if a
person is photographed entering a strip club, and he later
decides to change his ways, society should at least allow him
the opportunity to improve and reform. But once this image
is recorded and preserved in perpetuity, the individual may
175. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 74 ("The problem with Internet gossip is
that it can so readily be untethered from its context."); Jennifer Lee, Trying to
Elude the Google Grasp, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at G1 ("The fragments of
people's lives that emerge on the Internet are somewhat haphazard. They can
be incomplete, out of context, misleading or simply wrong.").
176. Solove, supra note 168, at 993.
177. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 67.
178. Id. at 70 ("People protect certain secrets because disclosure might lead
to stereotyping and discrimination toward them and their families.").
179. See Solove, supra note 168, at 1034.
180. Bernhard Warner, How to Be UnGoogleable, TIMES ONLINE (London),
May 28, 2008,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol]/news/tech-and-web/theweb/article40223
74.ece ("Once your name gets into the search engine, removing all traces of
yourself from the [Ilnternet is next to impossible.").
181. See infra Part III.C.1.
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never be able to live down what could have been a single
error.1 12  Essentially, this is a case of the tragedy of the
commons. Omniveillers are able to internalize the value of
the streets, buildings, and people in major American cities by
relying on weak privacy torts. Meanwhile, the people who are
being photographed suffer a negative externality, namely the
invasion of their privacy and damage to their reputation,
which they have no way of remedying.
The story of "gae-ttong-nyue," roughly translated from
Korean as "dog poop girl," is an excellent illustration of this
phenomenon.8 3  On a subway train in South Korea, a
woman's small dog defecated on the floor, and the owner
refused to clean it up after a fellow passenger asked her.'84
By itself, this may seem like a random incident that happens
countless times a day that people forget as soon as they see
it.18 5  However, the Internet has forever changed this
dynamic.1 8 6  A nosey photographer on the train snapped a
digital picture of the dog owner on his cellular phone and
posted it on a popular Korean web log.'8 ' The girl was quickly
nicknamed "gae-ttong-nyue," her picture was broadcasted and
parodied all over the Internet, and people started recognizing
her on the street. 8 8  Soon, the story spread to newspapers
and web sites worldwide.8 9 Because of the power of the
Internet, what once would have been an isolated incident that
people forgot as soon as it happened transformed into a global
craze.' 9° As a result of dog poop girl's public shaming and
embarrassment, she was forced to drop out of her
182. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 38 ("Increasingly, information fragments
about people on the Internet are used to make judgments about them.").
183. Id. at 1.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 2.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 1-3; see also Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.orgwiki/Blog (last
visited Oct. 6, 2008) (defining a blog as a short name for a web log, which is a
running online commentary about one's personal thoughts and observations).
188. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 2.
189. Id.
190. See id. ("We live in an age drenched in data, and the implications are
both wonderful and terrifying."); Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates into
Test of Internet's Power to Shame, WASH. POST, July 7 2005, at D1 (quoting
Howard Rheingold) ("The shadow side of the empowerment that comes with a
billion and a half people being online is the surveillance aspect .... We used to
worry about big brother-the state-but now of course it's our neighbors, or
people on the subway.").
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university.' 9'
Once a secret is out, society cannot unring the bell. 192
The dog poop girl "will not be forgotten. That's what the
Internet changes . . . [and] forever, she will be captured in
Google's unforgiving memory" in the form of a permanent
digital scarlet letter.' 93 If this incident would only have been
recalled by the select few who witnessed it, those people may
have been able to obtain an explanation why the girl refused
to clean up the mess. Perhaps there was a legitimate and
valid reason why she chose not to clean up her dog's
droppings. However, because of the unblinking eye of digital
cameras and the outbreak speed that the Internet enables,
this woman will never be able to provide an explanation. If a
person does find an image of himself that he finds offensive,
there is little recourse to tell his side of the story.
2. Threat to Free Speech and Expression
Failing to protect privacy in public can also inhibit free
expression. It is important to remember that speech and
expression are not limited to writing and speaking. Rather, a
person's choice to be present in various locations in front of a
specific audience is indicative of speech as "expressive
conduct," and is a form of protected expression under modern
First Amendment jurisprudence.'94 A person marching in a
191. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 2.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 8, 11 ("The Internet is bringing back the scarlet letter in digital
form-an indelible record of people's past misdeeds.").
194. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Circ.
1983), rev'd, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, D.C.
Circuit Judge Scalia acknowledged that "[tihe cases find within the First
Amendment some protection for 'expressive conduct' apart from spoken and
written thought." Id. Although he continued in strong disagreement with that
view:
I start from the premise that when the Constitution said "speech" it
meant speech and not all forms of expression. Otherwise, it would
have been unnecessary to address "freedom of the press" separately-
or, for that matter, "freedom of assembly," which was obviously
directed at facilitating expression. The effect of the speech and press
guarantees is to provide special protection against all laws that
impinge upon spoken or written communication (which I will, for the
sake of simplicity, refer to generically as "speech") even if they do so for
purposes that have nothing to do with communication, such as the
suppression of noise or the elimination of litter. But to extend
equivalent protection against laws that affect actions which happen to
be conducted for the purpose of "making a point" is to stretch the
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protest, walking into a political campaign headquarters, or
sleeping in front of the White House, all convey a specific
message, even though no words are spoken or written. This
distinction is especially profound in the case of omniveillance,
where people are plucked from anonymity and thrust into the
public eye based on their location at an instant in time.
Recording people's activity can have chilling effects on speech.
People may choose to moderate their behavior in order to
avoid harassment, if they are embarrassed of their actions, or
fear retaliation by others for their choices. By positively
protecting an omniveiller's speech (the right to reproduce
photographs), society is negatively restraining an individual's
speech (the right to freely express himself).
For example, suppose that a person leads a very upright
and moral lifestyle in his public life. However, on the side, he
chooses to engage in immorality and debauchery, and does
not want or trust others to know about that side of his
character. Because people often express different types of
personalities in different contexts, the recording and
broadcasting of his behavior would destroy the voluntary
dichotomy in his life. This can result in a chilling effect
where people feel suffocated and will be afraid to express
themselves as they would like, for fear of being caught.
Personal information posted on the Internet has already
detrimentally impacted job candidates who were denied
employment because of their embarrassing user profiles on
Facebook, a popular social networking Internet site.195 Chief
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recused himself from an obscenity trial after questionable
obscene images were found on his personal Internet server. 196
In the case of Ashley Alexandra Dupre, also known as
Kristen, who was connected with former New York Governor
Spitzer in a prostitution sting, the aspiring "musician"
quickly attempted to delete information from her Facebook
and MySpace profiles after the New York Times released her
identity, in order to avoid further embarrassment. 197 Other
Constitution not only beyond its meaning but beyond reason, and
beyond the capacity of any legal system to accommodate.
Id.
195. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 38.
196. Editorial, supra note 171.
197. Mallory Simon, Dupre's MySpace Page Evolves with Scandal, CNN,
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people who post religious, cultural, and political opinions
have reported unwanted harassment.'98 The only difference
between Facebook or MySpace and omniveillance is that the
Facebook personal profile was voluntarily created. With
omniveillance, the individual had no choice, but rather was
thrust into the public eye. 99
Computer hacker Tom Owad illustrated how the
aggregation of information on the Internet can stifle free
speech. By taking data from online retailer Amazon.com's
customer wish lists (books customers wish to buy), and
combining those wish lists with a customer's address, Owad
developed a program that allows anyone to locate satellite
pictures on Google of the homes of people who are reading
"subversive books" (including works by authors such as
George Orwell, Aldous Huxley, and Ray Bradbury).00 To
display what books a person chooses to read, and then to
locate where they live, can chill speech in unimaginable ways.
If Owad decided to incorporate his program using Street
View, people walking on the street could be identified by the
books they read, and prejudicial assumptions can be drawn
about them that may or may not be true. The right balance of
privacy and information, where neither is absolute, can foster
promotion of individual autonomy and expression and will
provide a positive externality to society. In fact, under the
right circumstances, "privacy protections do not just inhibit
free speech; they can promote it as well," as "some restrictions
on speech can enhance our freedom to speak.
2 0
'
3. Threat to Safety
In addition to the effects of insufficient privacy protection
on a person's reputation and his ability to freely express
himself, omniveillance also poses great threats to a person's
safety. Google is already providing a "mashup" service that
allows Internet users to incorporate Street View panoramas
Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/13/ashley.myspace/index.html.
198. See Janet Kornblum, Social, Work Lives Collide on Networking Websites,
USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2008, at 1A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2008-01-17-social-network-
nobarriersN.htm.
199. See infra Part III.D.2.c.
200. Posting of Tom Owad to Applefritter,
http://www.applefritter.com/bannedbooks (Jan. 4, 2006, 20:37).
201. See Solove, supra note 168, at 994, 1000.
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onto their own Internet sites.2 °2 As well, Google recently
introduced its "Friend Connect" service, allowing Google to
pull personal information from other social networks onto
third-party websites. °3 This functionality could allow data-
mining companies to expropriate this information from
Google's database for other purposes. This information could
also become accessible to those with nefarious motives.
Possibilities of black mail, extortion, and fraud are endless.
Imagine someone threatening a husband to show his wife
pictures of him near a strip club, or another person
threatening to expose an evangelical minister's wife who was
photographed entering a women's health clinic.
Omniveillance even poses a threat to national security.
Fearing that terrorists could use detailed photographs of
federal buildings for malicious ends, the Department of
Defense has already banned Google from photographing
military bases using Street View.2 °4 In the United Kingdom,
demonstrators who protested on top of the House of
Parliament utilized Google's satellite maps to plan their
trespass onto government property.2 5  Also in England,
trespassers are using Google's satellite imaging service to
find where swimming pools are located, and subsequently to
break into people's backyards.2 6 This new technology may
also make planning crimes easier. A potential criminal may
easily case houses or understand the schedules of potential
victims in planning the commission of a crime.20 7 A group
202. Weisman, supra note 124.
203. Posting of Dan Farber to CNET News Blog, http://www.news.com/8301-
13953_3-9941039-80.html?tag=nefd.riv (May 10, 2008, 6:13 PDT).
204. Jonathan Richards, Pentagon Bans Google from U.S. Bases, TIMES
ONLINE (London), Mar. 7, 2008,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech andweb/article3503624.ece.
205. Jonathan Leake, Google Earth Showed Protesters Way to Conquer
Parliament, TIMES ONLINE (London), Mar. 2, 2008, at 12, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3458431.ece.
206. The Google Earth Gatecrashers Who Take Uninvited Dips in
Homeowners' Swimming Pools, THIS IS LONDON, June 18, 2008,
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23496124-
details/The+Google+Earth+gatecrashers+who+take+uninvited+dips+in+home-
owners%27+swimming+pools/article.do.
207. Cf. Brendan Roberts, Google for a Murder Clue, HERALD SUN (Austl.),
Dec. 13, 2007, at 8, available at
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22916799-2,00.html?from=public-rss
(reporting that the Google Street View surveillance vehicle may have recorded
the identity of a suspect who dumped a body in an Australian town).
349
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
called Stop Child Predators is seeking to ban Google from
photographing neighborhoods, contending that Street View
allows child predators to easily see where minors congregate,
which could be used to target society's most innocent
victims."' This predatory behavior becomes as facile as
clicking around the Internet. Cyber-stalking can take on a
whole new meaning. Additionally, with a subpoena, the
government has ready access to a free surveillance network,
further imperiling our civil liberties. 20 9 At this stage, Warren
and Brandeis's right to privacy is no longer on life support or
in limbo, but rather is dead.2 10
E. Existing Privacy Torts Are Incapable of Dealing with
Omniveillance
Often the law strives to keep up with emerging
technology.211  Privacy is a perfect example of this
phenomenon. The advancement of technology may make the
"right to be let alone" a casualty of the information
revolution.1 2 Omniveillance could push this limit almost to
its breaking point by exploiting the images of every person in
America into a virtual commercial Orwellian state.
Omniveillance is an entirely new species of privacy invasion,
and should be treated differently. I do not intend to paint a
bleak picture of the future, but privacy law has not kept pace
with emerging technology. As dangerous and threatening as
208. Posting of Stephen Shankland to CNET News Blog,
http://news.cnet.com/8301- 10233-9996444-93.html?tag=nefd.top (July 22, 2008,
08:50 PDT).
209. See also Bryn Mickle, Your Name Here: City to Swap Ad Space for
Camera Funds, THE FLINT JOURNAL (Mich.), July 27, 2008, at A03, available at
http://www.mlive.com/flintjournal/index.ssf/2008/07/flint-seeks-sponsors-for-po
lic.html (reporting that "[tihe City of Flint [Michigan] is looking for sponsors for
surveillance cameras that will be mounted around the city to keep a watch out
for crooks. In exchange for cash, the city will plaster business names next to
police logos on the pole-mounted camera boxes," although it is not known
whether Google will participate in this sponsorship).
210. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 2388 (arguing that "as conceived by
Warren and Brandeis, the tort of invasion of privacy is probably best described
as alive, but on life support").
211. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("Where .. .the
Government uses a [new thermal imaging] device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.").
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1977).
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this new technology is to society, there is little that can be
done about it under current privacy jurisprudence.
Due to the modem interpretation of privacy laws, few
remedies exist for invasions of privacy in public. The public
disclosure of private facts tort is restrained by a very broad
newsworthiness exception that recognizes any matter that
possesses a modicum of social value as newsworthy, and thus
can be reproduced without concern for privacy.213  The
intrusion upon seclusion tort does not apply when an invasion
occurs in public, thereby allowing omniveillers to freely graze
upon the commons, internalizing all of society's positive
externalities, and shifting the negative externalities to the
people.214 Just like a couple embracing in public, 215 or a soccer
player's genitalia slipping out,216 anything that happens in
public or anything that could be considered newsworthy
cannot be remedied by the existing privacy torts. For that
reason, the invasion of privacy suit filed against Google by
the couple in Pittsburgh whose house was photographed by
Street View will surely fail, as under the current
jurisprudence, photographing anything visible from public
streets is perfectly proper.21 7
In the absence of any legal obligations, corporations are
only bound by their internal corporate ethics. Over a year
after the launch of Street View, Google announced an
initiative to develop a technology to blur out people's faces in
its Street View program.218
Praising this blurring initiative, a Google spokeswoman
said that "[t]he purpose of Street View isn't looking at people,
it's looking at buildings and locations. Obviously, we want to
take steps in protecting people's privacy, but from the
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (1977).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
215. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (holding that the
magazine is not liable for invasion of privacy tort for publishing a photograph of
a couple embracing in public because the photo possesses social value and falls
within the newsworthiness exception).
216. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that the newspaper is not liable for intrusion upon seclusion
tort for reproducing a photograph of a soccer player with exposed genitals taken
during a public soccer game because the event occurred in public).
217. Elinson, supra note 118.
218. Agence France-Presse, Google Blurs Faces in Street View Map Pictures,
BREITBART, May 14, 2008,
http://breitbart.com/print.php?id=080514214733.2nl3nqsx&showarticle=1.
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beginning we've been committed to doing this." 19 However,
less than a year earlier at the time of Street View's launch,
Mr. Flesicher, Google's Privacy Counsel, was asked why
Google did not blur out people's faces in order to assuage
privacy concerns. The attorney retorted that "[iut comes down
to a trade-off between free speech and a wealth of information
and a 'city of [blurred-out] zombies.' "220 Such a blatant
contradiction on a fundamental aspect of Street View raises
serious concerns about the ethos of a company that
aggregates so much information about millions of people.
Grotesque!22' Further implicit in this new technology is
Google's possession of a capability that can discern what is
and what is not a face, underscoring the evolution of its
powerful image searching and tagging capabilities. 222  If
Street View can blur a face, with existing facial recognition
technology, it could reasonably also ascertain the face's
identity.
Even if Google does blur people's faces in Street View at
the present, its motivation was not to comply with any legal
compulsions.223 What is to prevent it from changing its mind
tomorrow and deciding that a valuable purpose of Street View
is to reveal people's identities? Or what if the blurring
process is inadequate, and fails to properly obscure a person's
identity? Or what if a computer hacker figures out a way to
unblur the faces? Although Google does offer an option where
people can request a certain image be removed from Street
View,224 there is no guarantee the company will oblige. What
Google giveth, Google taketh away.
In the case of omniveillance, no valid legal mechanism
exists to enjoin this behavior. If at some point in the future,
Google, or any other omniveiller, decides to voluntarily make
peoples' faces clear and identifiable, no law or legal concern
would prevent it. In the words of the attorney representing
the Pittsburgh family who sued Google for invasion of
219. Agence France-Presse, supra note 218.
220. Global Privacy Regime Needed, Google Privacy Chief Says, WASHINGTON
INTERNET DAILY, July 5, 2007, at Today's News.
221. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2795 (2008) (Scalia, J.).
222. See supra Part II.C.
223. Agence France-Presse, supra note 218.
224. See Posting of Stephen Shankland to CNET News Blog,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10009394-93.html?tag=nefd.riv.
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privacy, "[wihat's to motivate them to change and put in
better internal controls?" 225 Short of Google's self-proclaimed
goal to do no evil, it has no legal incentive to protect privacy
in America.226
Appropriate action needs to be taken now to address
these issues, and preempt the identical world of Big Brother
that prominent writers and futurists have warned about for
decades. Some may suggest banning omniveillance
altogether, much like Canada may be contemplating. 27 But,
such a broad approach would be unnecessarily restrictive and
overbroad. Further, under American free speech
jurisprudence, such a ban would most likely conflict with the
First Amendment.228  Others may suggest banning
omniveillers from recording on public property by resorting to
trespass laws. North Oaks, Minnesota, an enclosed and
resident-owned community, relying on trespassing laws,
complained about the photos and succeeded in having them
removed from Street View.229 In a small town, for example,
such steps may be practical, but in larger areas, the costs of
policing this could become astronomical. Allowing an
enforcement agency to inspect and monitor people and their
vehicles for recording instruments would require substantive
transaction costs, and may run afoul of the search and seizure
protections of the Fourth Amendment. Compared to these
more-onerous and inefficient means, the right to your digital
identity is a crucial sword in the battle for privacy rights in
America. In sum, the Google generation needs the right to
your digital identity in order to provide victims of
omniveillance with a remedy in tort, and create an
225. Elinson, supra note 118.
226. See John, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
227. Terry Pedwell, Google's New Street-Level View Concerns Privacy
Commissioner, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Sept. 12, 2007, at A7, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/09/1 1lstreetview-commissioner-
privacy.html.
228. See infra Part III.D.
229. Posting of Eric Zeman to The Information Week Blog,
http://www.informationweek.comlblog/main/archives/2008/06/north-oaksminn.
htmljsessionid=XHXCCZX4RR4YYQSNDLPSKHSCJUNN2JVN?queryText=st
reet+view (June 2, 2008, 09:50). See also Nathan Halverson, Google Claims
Right to Post Photos from Private Land, PRESS DEMOCRAT.COM, Aug. 21, 2008,
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20080821/NEWS/10644/0/news07
(reporting that residents of Sonoma County, California complained that Google
trespassed onto private property to record their town).
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equilibrium between privacy and free speech.
III. THE RIGHT TO YOUR DIGITAL IDENTITY-A TORT TO
REMEDY VICTIMS OF OMNIVEILLANCE
Threatened by the specter of omniveillance, our near-
future selves will need a remedy in order to redress violations
of our right to privacy. This section will introduce the right to
your digital identity. This tort will provide a remedy when a
person's image is converted into a digital image and
distributed over the Internet. This tort does not focus on
government surveillance or Fourth Amendment issues. This
tort will be based on the philosophy that there is positive
societal value to protecting privacy in public, and that privacy
can actually promote free speech and prevent negative
societal effects.23 ° This tort will consist of a multi-factor
balancing test to preserve the precious equilibrium between
free speech and privacy, and will be enforced as a common-
law tort. This framework will draw together many aspects of
privacy law from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
common law, criminal law, and more recent privacy statutes
that have evolved to deal with changing social and technical
developments. All of these factors serve as useful guideposts
to develop the right to your digital identity.
By implementing a multi-factor balancing test that takes
into consideration the necessity of a free press, but also
factoring in privacy interests, this tort will provide judges
with a fair scale to balance the privacy suit of a victim of
omniveillance. No single factor is dispositive. Rather, the
totality of the circumstances determines if liability is
appropriate in a case where omniveillance invades privacy.
The following is a concise statement of the right to your
digital identity:
The right to your digital identity is violated when an
individual or organization records and reproduces an
image of another without consent using a visual or
auditory enhancing device while (1) the party
recorded possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy to not be recorded; (2) the matter recorded
would be offensive to a reasonable person; (3) the
230. See supra Part I.C.
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recording is intentionally widely transferred or
disseminated through any electronic medium to any
electronic format; and (4) the recording is not
newsworthy, where a newsworthy recording (4a) has
social value, (4b) minimally intrudes into ostensibly
private affairs, and (4c) the party that is recorded
voluntarily acceded to the position of public notoriety.
The following analysis, fashioned in the format of the
Restatement of Torts, will provide analysis and comments for
each of the elements, in addition to illustrations of how the
tort would be applied under different circumstances.231
A. Element 1-Reasonable Expectation of Privacy to Not Be
Recorded
The first element of this new tort is based on the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion,2 32 rather than public disclosure of
private facts.233 The intrusion tort is more adept at dealing
with the nature of the omniveillance invasion; it focuses on
the intrusion rather than the subsequent dissemination of the
private image. Therefore, Florida Star,234 which severely
limited the tort of public disclosure of private facts, is not on
point, and does not serve as a bar to liability for this element.
The primary obstacle to the intrusion tort providing a remedy
for omniveillance does not lie in the Restatement's definition
of the tort, but rather exists in the comments. While the tort
231. The Australian Law Reform Commission has recently proposed a
privacy tort that closely mirrors the tort developed in this article. See, e.g.,
Chris Merrit, Privacy Tort a Blow to Free Speech, THE AUSTRALIAN, May 29,
2008, at 32, available at
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23774694-17044,00.html
(reporting that the Australian Law Reform Commission proposed a privacy tort
that mirrors the one proposed in this article, which applies when there is "a
reasonable expectation of privacy and where the action that is the subject of the
complaint is serious enough to cause substantial offence to an ordinary person").
See generally AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, ALRC DISCUSSION PAPER
72 REVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW (2007), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/dp/72/12.pdf.
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
234. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that the publication
of a rape victim's name does not violate her privacy because the information
was available to the public and finding that the government could only regulate
what a newspaper could publish in order to "further a state interest of the
highest order").
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allows remedies for intrusions upon a person's "private affairs
or concerns,"235 which logically includes protection of a person
acting within a public place, the comments refute this notion
and insist that a person photographed in public is by
definition not in seclusion.236
Although a person relinquishes a large portion of his
privacy by leaving his home, a person does not give up all of
his privacy.237 Such a binary proposition, that privacy only
exists in a private place but disappears in its entirety once a
person steps out into public, is untenable.28  This strict
interpretation of the intrusion upon seclusion tort is not
capable of fostering an understanding that privacy far
exceeds simple notions of physical seclusion.239 Privacy is not
an all-or-nothing proposition, but is a matter of degree.24 °
Thus, this element borrows ideas from criminal law,
paparazzi statutes, and voyeurism statutes, where the law
has developed a nuanced view of privacy and has recognized a
qualified right to privacy on public property. The right to
your digital identity abandons the strict public/private
property distinction and discerns whether the victim
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy.
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Privacy in
Public
The concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy was
first recognized in the landmark criminal law decision, Katz
v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that privacy
235. McClurg, supra note 72, at 1055.
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977); see also Gill
v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J., dissenting) ("In
effect, the majority holding means that anything anyone does outside of his own
home is with consent to the publication thereof, because, under those
circumstances he waives his right to privacy even though there is no news value
in the event."); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1979) ("The appearance of a person in a public place necessarily involves
doffing the cloak of privacy which the law protects.").
237. McClurg, supra note 72, at 1041.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1055.
240. Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67, 71-72 (Cal. 1999) ('[N]either in Schulman
nor in any other case have we stated that an expectation of privacy, in order to
be reasonable for purposes of the intrusion tort, must be of absolute or complete
privacy .... [Pirivacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-
nothing characteristic.").
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can be violated even when a person is in a public phone
booth.241 As long as the person possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of whether the person was
on public or private property, privacy exists and should be
protected in the Fourth Amendment context.242  Katz
overruled the prior precedent of Olmstead v. United States
that was similar to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as
Olmstead held that privacy could only be violated if there was
a physical trespass onto private property.2 43 The Katz Court
defined reasonable expectation of privacy based on a
subjective element determined by what the defendant
thought, and an objective element based on what society
recognized as reasonable.2 "
This concept is not limited to criminal law. California
chose to abandon the strict distinction between public and
private property when crafting its paparazzi statutes.245 The
California legislature recognized that most of the invasive
photography by paparazzi occurred in public, and that skilled
paparazzi rarely trespassed onto private property.246 Because
the intrusion upon seclusion tort is only effective for
protecting people on private property, this tort could not
provide an effective remedy. 247 As a result, the California
legislature devised the notion of constructive trespass.248
Under the California paparazzi statute, rather than
drawing a distinct line between public and private places,
when a paparazzo attempts to capture an image where a
person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" by using a
"visual or auditory enhancing device," the defendant is
liable. 249  This statute invoked the distinction that the
California Supreme Court discussed in Sanders v. ABC-in
that there are "degrees and nuances" to privacy.2 ° By
241. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
see also McClurg, supra note 73, at 1029.
242. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
243. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928).
244. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
245. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1708.8(b) (Deering 2005).
246. See id.
247. McClurg, supra note 72, at 1055.
248. See § 1708.8(b).
249. See id.
250. Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (citing 1 MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.10 (1998)) ("There are degrees and
nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy . . . . Like
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codifying this understanding, the legislature implicitly
acknowledged that a person's mere presence in public is not
an absolute bar to recovering for an invasion of privacy.
Therefore, if a victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
even if he is in a public location, the paparazzo could still be
found liable for constructive trespass, because no physical
trespass is required.
Recently, Los Angeles councilman Dennis Zine proposed
a new ordinance creating a "personal safety zone" of several
feet of clear space between a paparazzo and the victim,
dubbed "Britney['s] Law," thus recognizing that a zone of
privacy can exist in public.25' The Mayor of Malibu has also
called for the creation of a safe zone around celebrities.
252
These laws serve as an important step towards recognizing
privacy in public, eschewing with the binary Restatement
approach, and are an important basis for the first element of
the right to your digital identity.
Laws prohibiting voyeurism exemplify another prime
example where legislatures have adapted the law to create a
specific realm of privacy within public in order to adapt to the
evolution of society and technology. Implicit in voyeurism is
the surreptitious recording of people without their consent,
often by positioning cameras in hidden places with the intent
to photograph a person's intimate areas.5 3 In order to
combat this invasion of privacy, California passed a "Peeping
Tom" statute closely modeled after the intrusion upon
seclusion tort.2 4  The statute criminalized looking into a
private area where the occupant possessed a reasonable
'privacy,' the concept of 'seclusion' is relative. The mere fact that a person can
be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be
forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.").
251. L.A. Police Chief Disses Proposed 'Britney Law,' CNN, Aug. 1, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/01/paparazzi.crackdown/index.html
(named after oft-photographed celebrity Britney Spears); Jill Serjeant, L.A.
Police Chief Says Paparazzi Law Unenforceable, REUTERS, Apr. 8, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/entertainmentNews/idUSN0836699420080408?f
eedType=RSS&feedName=entertainmentNews&sp=true (named after Britney
Spears, a frequent victim of paparazzi).
252. Ken Starr Helping Lawmakers Fight Paparazzi, CNN, June 10, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/10/starr.paparazzi/index.html.
253. See generally David D. Kremenetsky, Insatiable "Up-Skirt" Voyeurs
Force California Lawmakers to Expand Privacy Protection in Public Places, 31
McGEORGE L. REV. 285, 288 (2000).
254. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j) (Deering 2008).
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expectation of privacy using a recording device with the
intent to invade the person's privacy.25 5 However, this law
still failed to provide any protections for voyeurism in public,
as the intrusion upon seclusion tort is restricted to private
areas (such as bathrooms, locker rooms, etc.).256 As a result,
voyeurs who photographed the most sensitive areas of non-
minors in public escaped any liability. 25
7
In response to some of the more egregious voyeurism
stories in the news 258 and recognizing this loophole that
traditional privacy law created, the California Legislature
enacted Chapter 231. This law amended the previous
Peeping Tom statute and expanded the protection area from a
private area to any public area, where the voyeur has an
intent for sexual gratification and the victim possesses a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 259 By widening the target
zone to wherever "the other person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy,"26 ° the legislature implicitly recognized
that even when a victim is in public, if he nonetheless
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy, then he will
still be protected. So as not to encroach on First Amendment
protections for the press, this amendment did not criminalize
255. Id.
256. Kremenetsky, supra note 253, at 288.
257. See Bill Rams, Cyber-Peeping: It's Growing, It's Frustrating, and It's
Legal-Trend: Officials Say There's Nothing They Can Do to Stop Men from
Filming up Skirts in Public Places, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 26, 1998, at Al
(reporting that men caught using video cameras to surreptitiously film up
women's skirts and down their blouses); Bill Rams, Prosecuting Up-Skirt
Videotaping May Be Uphill Battle, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 27, 1998, at B2.
258. See, e.g., Kremenetsky, supra note 253, at 286 (observing that a man
who slid a bag containing a camera under a woman's legs at Disneyland,
another man who filmed down women's tops after getting off a ride at the
Strawberry Festival, and a third man who filmed adult beachgoers with a
camera concealed in a stereo were all able to escape liability under the previous
Peeping Tom statute because the recordings occurred in public).
259. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(2) (Deering 2008). Section 647 reads:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: Any person who uses a concealed
camcorder . . . to secretly videotape . . . another, identifiable person
under or through the clothing being worn by that other person ...
without the consent or knowledge of that other person, with the intent
to arouse, appeal to or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desires of
that person and invade the privacy of that other person, under
circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
260. See id.
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the works of photojournalists.26 1
The problem of voyeurism has become even more
exacerbated since the introduction of cell phones equipped
with digital cameras, the sales of which have recently
surpassed those of traditional digital cameras.262 These
portable devices enable a Peeping Tom to secretly snap
photographs of anyone at any time without notice, and easily
upload these photographs to the Internet for anyone to
view."' This is exactly what Samuel Warren and Justice
Brandeis feared when they wrote about instant cameras
surreptitiously weakening privacy rights.264 In response to
this outbreak of voyeurs secretly photographing people's
private areas without their consent,265 Congress passed the
Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 that prohibited
capturing an image of a person's private areas without their
consent.266 Textually, the act does not treat being filmed in
public as an absolute bar to liability, but rather focuses on
whether the victim possesses a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" that can exist "regardless of whether that person is
in a public or private place." 267
The relevant legislative history268 shows that the act is
261. CAL. S. COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF AB 182, at 4 (1999).
262. See generally Aimee Jodoi Lum, Don't Smile, Your Image Has Just Been
Recorded on a Camera-Phone: The Need for Privacy in the Public Sphere, 27 U.
HAW. L. REV. 377 (2004).
263. See, e.g., id. at 379.
264. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 210.
265. See 149 CONG. REC. 15571 (2003) (statement of Sen. DeWine) ("The
widespread availability of low-cost, high-resolution cameras has lead to an
increase in the number of high-profile cases of 'video-voyeurism' all over our
country. Reports of women being secretly videotaped through their clothing at
shopping malls, amusement parks, and other public places are far too
common.").
266. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-495, 118 Stat.
3999 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004)).
267. Id.
268. For a statement on the usefulness of legislative history, see ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29-30 (1997) ("My view that the
objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is
what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative
history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute's
meaning."). For a statement on one's reliance on legislative history, see
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE 49 (2008) ("Since most
judges use legislative history, unless you know that the judge or panel [or law
review article reader] before which you are appearing does not do so, you must
use legislative history as well.").
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based on the "well-accepted legal concept that individuals are
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy."269 Departing
from the strictures of the Restatement (Second) of Tort's
intrusion upon seclusion tort, and resuscitating the "right to
be let alone" from Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis,
Congress had specifically identified that in certain
circumstances, a reasonable expectation of privacy does exist
in public places.
Following the passage of the federal act, many states
amended their local laws to provide similar protections. ° In
the state of Washington, the legislature passed a voyeurism
statute that created liability for voyeurs.2 7' The law applied
to victims in a place where there a reasonable expectation of
privacy could be found. 272  However, adhering to the
comments from the Restatement of Torts,273 the Washington
Supreme Court found that "the voyeurism statute, as written,
does not prohibit upskirt photography in a public location,"
even if that was the legislature's intent.274 In response to this
case, the Washington Legislature amended the voyeurism
statute to specifically permit liability if the victim possesses a
reasonable expectation of privacy "in a public or private
place," clearly evincing an intent to create a zone of privacy in
public places.275 In Louisiana, the voyeurism statute draws
no distinction based on whether the victim is in a public or a
private place, or even whether he possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 6  Rather, if a person is recorded
without his consent for lascivious purposes, even if it is a
public place, the voyeur has violated the law.277
269. 150 CONG. REC. H7267 (2004) (statement of Sen. Sensenbrenner).
270. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1111 (2004) (amended by 2004 Haw.
Sess. Laws Act 83 (S.B. 2377) (eff. May 19, 2004)); see also Lum, supra note 262,
at 398.
271. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.115(2) (West 2000).
272. Id.; see also State v. Larson, No. 511696, 2003 WL 22766043, at *2
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2003) (citing WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.115(2)).
273. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
274. See State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 150-51 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (holding
that the state's voyeurism statute does not cover intrusions in a public location)
(emphasis added); see also Lum, supra note 262, at 401-02.
275. See Lum, supra note 263, at 402 (discussing WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.115(2)(b)).
276. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283(A) (2004).
277. See id.
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2. Application of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy to
Omniveillance
Katz, the California paparazzi laws, and the voyeurism
statutes "represent[U a shift of the boundary line in the battle
between privacy of individuals within society and the
community in which they live in favor of individual privacy,
and therefore impact[] the relatively new but dynamic field of
privacy law."278 Building on these blocks, the first element of
the right to your digital identity tort asks whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Even though the
laws discussed apply to prevent sexual deviancy or aggressive
celebrity obsessions, the lessons and principles still apply to
omniveillance. An expectation of privacy not to have your
genitals photographed is obviously greater than an
expectation of privacy not to have your face photographed.
But this philosophy should serve as a starting point.
Regulating immoral aspects of society should not be the end
of the road for developing privacy law. Rather, by analyzing
the rationales behind these privacy laws together with the
societal costs and benefits associated with such legislation, a
judge can properly assess whether a person possesses a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Returning to Katz, the test to determine if a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists is based on whether the
individual possesses a subjective belief that he has an
expectation of privacy, and whether society is prepared to
recognize that belief as reasonable." 9 To slightly modify Katz
for this tort, this element does not embody an expectation of
privacy not to be looked at, but specifically requires an
expectation of privacy not to be recorded. Whenever a person
goes outside, he expects to be watched by others-but he does
not expect to be photographed.
Questioning whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists solves several logical problems inherent in limiting
privacy protections to a private location. To illustrate this
conflict, if a person sits on his balcony, or next to a window in
plain view of the public, the intrusion upon seclusion tort
would probably protect him. Conversely, if a person leaves
the confines of his home and climbs to the top of the tallest
278. See, e.g., Kremenetsky, supra note 253, at 292.
279. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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mountain to be alone, the intrusion tort would not protect
him because it is not considered private property.
Furthermore, another distinction must be drawn between
different notions of "public." The middle of Times Square and
the middle of a forest may both be considered public property,
but the relative expectations of privacy in these locations are
worlds apart. Both an individual and society would recognize
that a person meditating alone at the top of a mountain or
reflecting with nature inside a park could have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, thus satisfying the two prongs of Katz.
But the same cannot be said for someone sitting on his
balcony facing a busy street filled with reporters.
Nonetheless, the privacy torts identically treat both of these
dissimilar situations. This goes against reason.
In the context of omniveillance, a person who walks on
the street in a major city has a reduced expectation of privacy
to not be recorded. However, this level is greater than zero,
depending on the person's identity and repute, the
individual's location, the time of day, the amount of other
people who can see the person, and the manner in which the
person may be camouflaging himself (hat, sunglasses, fake
beards, etc.). By analyzing whether a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists, this test balances what a person chose to
expose to the world, and what precautions were taken to
prevent exposures. This factor of the right to your digital
identity is a balancing test that must be judged on a case-by-
case basis.
B. Element 2-Offensive to Reasonable Person
The tort of public disclosure of private facts utilizes the
"highly offensive to a reasonable person" standard.8 ° Since
this standard was promulgated, society has become somewhat
accustomed and desensitized to privacy invasions in light of
reality television programs and celebrity gossip magazines.28
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see also Shulman v.
Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
281. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723,
737 (1999). The author pondered whether people expect anything to be private
anymore based on modern culture, noting that:
Our parents may appear on the television shows of Oprah Winfrey or
Jerry Springer to discuss incest, homosexuality, miscegenation,
adultery, transvestitism, and cruelty in the family. Our adopted
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What was once highly offensive may now only be offensive,
and what was once offensive, may not be anything out of the
ordinary today. The "highly offensive" standard is simply "a
difficult standard to satisfy."" 2 In order to rise to the level of
highly offensive, the conduct must be so intrusive that it
would cause "mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a
person of ordinary sensibilities."2 3  Applying the current
understanding of "highly offensive" to omniveillance, very few
adjudicators would be able to find liability under the tort of
public disclosure of private facts, as very little is highly
offensive these days. 8 4 Justice Carter's fear in his dissent in
Gill that "the blameless exposure of a portion of a naked body
of a man or woman in a public place as the result of
inefficient buttons, hooks or other clothes-holding devices
could be freely photographed and widely published with
complete immunity""2 5 has come to fruition.
A more realistic understanding of offensiveness is highly
relevant in light of omniveillance, since often people are
caught at their most embarrassing moments in the camera's
lens. Short of a person being photographed without clothes,
or engaged in a lewd position, there is not much that is
considered highly offensive in today's society. However
humiliating circumstances may be, if they fail to rise to the
highly offensive level, no remedy is available. A photograph
children may go on television to be reunited with their birth parents.
Our law students may compete with their peers for a spot on the MTV
program The Real World, and a chance to live with television cameras
for months on end and be viewed by mass audiences.
Id.; see also ROSEN, supra note 79, at 157 ("We expose details of our personal
lives on talk shows and on the Internet, and we enjoy watching others expose
themselves in a similarly exhibitionistic way on reality TV. Far from trying to
master our fears, we wallow in them by watching TV shows like Fear Factor,
where participants are forced to reenact their most dreaded anxieties; and we
crave similar alarmism from cable TV news, which has become like a 24/7
version of a reality show, pandering fear as a form of voyeuristic
entertainment.").
282. Tucker v. Merck & Co., No. Civ.A. 02-2421, 2003 WL 25592785, at *13
(E.D. Pa. May 2, 2003).
283. Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Tribune Review Newspaper Co., 809 A.2d 243, 248
(Pa. 2002).
284. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485-86 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that videotaping gory images of a woman after she was severely
wounded in a horrific car accident is not considered highly offensive).
285. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
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of a person inappropriately scratching himself in public may
not qualify as highly offensive. But it would more likely
satisfy an offensive standard. Similarly, a photograph of a
couple passionately kissing may not be considered highly
offensive, as this is standard fare on prime-time network
television. But it may be considered offensive. If a person is
readily identifiable, the level of offensiveness must increase.
In the event that an omniveiller blurs a person's face so that
the individual is unidentifiable, the level of offensiveness
drops to a nullity. By changing this standard for
omniveillance to offensive, the trier of fact will be able to
properly assess liability based on what is offensive to a
reasonable person. The finder of fact would not be
constrained by such a high threshold, as it is quite an
unworkable standard in light of modem day insensitivity to
grossly offensive images that are repeatedly broadcasted
throughout the media. As a result, a victim of omniveillance
has a legitimate chance at obtaining a remedy if the nature of
the photograph is simply offensive.
Recognizing the evolution of society, as it now takes more
to offend a reasonable person than it did when the
Restatement privacy torts were promulgated, California's
paparazzi law departed from this traditional standard of
"highly offensive to a reasonable person," and applied a lower
"offensive to a reasonable person" standard."6 This allowed
wider application of the law, tipping the scale in favor of
privacy and against the unlimited right of the press to gather
information. Following this development, the second element
of the right to your digital identity proposes lowering the
threshold to offensive to a reasonable person to allow for a
viable remedy against offensive reproductions of a person's
image.
C. Element 3-Widely Transferred or Disseminated through
an Electronic Medium
One of the most important aspects of the right to your
digital identity-that distinguishes it from previous privacy
torts-is the requirement that the recording be
indiscriminately disseminated to an electronic forum without
286. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (Deering 2005) (emphasis added).
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a concern for newsworthiness.8 7  The concept of
dissemination in privacy torts is most prominent in the tort of
public disclosure of private facts, where liability is
determined based on whether the defendant disclosed the
information to others."' The third element of the right to
your digital identity will focus on quantifying the distribution
of the recording. Whereas the tort of intrusion upon seclusion
occurs once the invasion occurs,289 the tort of public disclosure
of private facts occurs when non-newsworthy and highly
offensive images are reproduced and disseminated. 290  For
this reason, the disclosure tort will serve as the basis of the
third element of the right to your digital identity. However,
instead of restricting the distribution to an act that simply
"gives publicity,"291 the scope of this element will focus on how
the recording is transferred or disseminated through an
electronic medium.
1. Quantifying the Degree of Disclosure
In passing the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004,
Congress addressed its concern with the Internet's ability to
easily and instantly disseminate voyeuristic photographs to a
global audience.292 The House Reports 293 noted that violations
287. See infra Part III.D.
288. See Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (White, J., dissenting)
("Florida wanted to prevent the widespread distribution of rape victim's names,
and therefore enacted a statute tailored almost as precisely as possible to
achieving that end."); see also McClurg, supra note 72, at 1057. In the context
of obscenity law, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (noting that
the general distribution of obscene materials is a great danger because it may
"intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public.").
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
291. Id.
292. H.R. REP. No. 108-504, at 2 (2004) ("The development of small,
concealed cameras and cell phone cameras, along with the instantaneous
distribution capabilities of the Internet, have combined to create a threat to the
privacy of unsuspecting adults, high school students, and children .... [These
violations of privacy are] compounded when the pictures or photographs find
their way to the Internet . . . ."); 149 CONG. REC. 15571 (2003) (statement of
Sen. DeWine) ("The impact of video voyeurism on its victims is greatly
exacerbated by the Internet. As a result of Internet technology, the
photographs that a voyeur captures can be disseminated to a worldwide
audience in a matter of seconds. A State representative from Ohio,
Representative Ed Jerse, stated it best when he told ABC News that when a
woman's picture is posted on the Web, her privacy 'could be violated millions of
times.' ").
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of privacy are "compounded when the photographs find their
way to the Internet ... [and] the instantaneous distribution
capabilities of the Internet, have combined to create a threat
to . . .privacy. '"n" The Congressional Record reported that
"the impact of video voyeurism on its victims is greatly
exacerbated by the Internet. As a result of Internet
technology, the photographs that a voyeur captures can be
disseminated to a worldwide audience in a matter of
seconds."295 Representative Jerse even commented that a
victim's "privacy could be violated millions of times" if the
image is posted on the Internet.296
The Louisiana Legislature expressed similar concerns,
and recognized the role the Internet plays with modern day
Peeping Toms; it imposed criminal liability if a voyeur
transmits a voyeuristic photo over the Internet or any other
electronic medium.297 Both of these bodies realized the threat
that distribution over the Internet poses to privacy, and how
spreading information online can make the injury
substantially greater.298 These opinions mirrored Justice
Carter's observation in Gill that what a couple "did in view of
a tiny fraction of the public, does not mean that they
consented to observation by the millions or readers of the
defendant's magazine."299 But the question remains: how to
properly measure distribution for the purposes of this tort.
One methodology to quantify the dissemination is to
analyze social networks. 0 A perfect illustration of this
dynamic was discussed in Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v.
293. See supra note 268 for a discussion on the use of legislative history.
294. H.R. REP. No. 108-504, at 2.
295. 149 CONG. REC. 15571 (2003) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
296. Id.
297. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283(A) (2004) ("Video voyeurism is . . . [t]he
transfer of an image obtained by activity described in Paragraph (1) of this
Subsection by live or recorded telephone message, electronic mail, the Internet,
or a commercial online service.").
298. See also SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 11 ("From the dawn of time, people
have gossiped, circulated rumors, and shamed others. These social practices are
now moving over to the Internet, where they are taking on new dimensions.
They transform from forgettable whispers within small local groups to a
widespread and permanent chronicle of people's lives.").
299. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
300. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2005).
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Kubach. 13 ' In this case, plaintiff Kubach revealed that he was
HIV-positive to sixty close family members and friends. 2
Subsequently, he went on a television program to
anonymously discuss HIV, but the station failed to properly
blur out his face as he requested, making him easily
recognizable. 3 The plaintiff sued under the tort of public
disclosure of private facts, and the television station argued
that Kubach lost any expectation of privacy by telling so
many of his friends and family about his disease prior to the
broadcast. 4 The court looked at the social circles involved
and decided in favor of the plaintiff, holding that Kubach still
expected privacy because he only told people that "cared
about him" and would not likely spread the information. 5
Rather than strictly placing a numerical count on how
many people view the recording, this element will focus on
the social circles, or groups of friends in which information
travels.30 6 The degrees of separation between separate social
circles generally prevent private information from spilling
out.3 0 7  For example, an individual's notoriety in his
elementary school will usually not transfer over with him to
his university because the social group has changed.
Therefore, a court could look to see if the disclosure of private
information was something that was approximately contained
in a quasi-defined social circle. Or, the court could analyze if
the information was disclosed outside the bonds of trust, and
spread without concern for relationships and confidence.
Also, a judge could look to the norms about sharing
information within a group based on the different types of
relationships, such as between a professor and student, or
father and son, or employer and employee.08  If the
information was contained within a limited circle, it is
private, and should be protected. The maxim "what happens
in Vegas stays in Vegas" is apt. 9 Although these may seem
to be difficult determinations, courts constantly perform such
301. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994).
302. Id. at 493.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 494.
306. See Strahilevitz, supra note 300, at 919.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 179.
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a fuzzy analysis when applying the Pinkerton doctrine in
identifying conspiracies in criminal law. 1°
In addition to social networks, it is important to
understand how information is rapidly disseminated
throughout the Internet in a phenomenon known as "viral"
distributions.3 11 The Internet, unlike any library or reporting
service in the world, is unique in that it allows an almost
infinite supply of information to be accessed instantly.
Perhaps one of the most famous examples of viral distribution
is the "Star Wars Kid," in which a video of an awkward
adolescent acting out scenes from the movie Star Wars
exploded onto the Internet and was viewed millions of times
within weeks of its release.312
Viral videos are so prominent in our culture that an order
from a Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas footnoted to a
video on YouTubeY' 3 Once recordings are made of a person in
310. See generally Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946)
(holding that when the finder of fact determines that the defendant is joined in
a conspiracy, substantive crimes committed to advance that conspiracy can be
charged to all defendants as long as they are still part of the conspiracy when
those crimes are committed). Courts use Pinkerton to determine whether
certain individuals were members of a conspiracy, when the individuals joined
the conspiracy, and what their involvement was in certain activities with the
group. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996).
311. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.orgwiki/Viral-marketing (last visited
Oct. 8, 2008) ("Viral marketing and viral advertising refer to marketing
techniques that use pre-existing social networks to produce increases in brand
awareness . . .through self-replicating viral processes, analogous to the spread
of pathological and computer viruses. It can be word-of-mouth delivered or
enhanced by the network effects of the Internet. Viral marketing is a
marketing phenomenon that facilitates and encourages people to pass along a
marketing message voluntarily."); see also MarketingTerms.com, Viral
Marketing, http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/viral-marketing/ (last
visited Oct. 8, 2008). Viral Marketing is defined as a "[m]arketing phenomenon
that facilitates and encourages people to pass along a marketing message." Id.
"Viral marketing depends on a high pass-along rate from person to person. If a
large percentage of recipients forward something to a large number of friends,
the overall growth snowballs very quickly." Id.
312. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 44-48 (recounting the history of the "Star
Wars Kid" phenomenon). It is worth noting that the teenager, who did not
intend anyone else to see the video, was so humiliated that he dropped out of
high school and sought psychiatric care. Id. This is similar to the indignation
that the "dog poop girl" also experienced, who also dropped out of her university.
Id. at 2; see supra text accompanying notes 183-91. As a result of a single
personal experience, taken out of context, and virally spread throughout the
Internet, permanent damage is done to people's lives.
313. FKM P'ship v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Hous. Sys., 255 S.W.3d 619,
639 (Tex. 2008) (Willett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), available at
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public, the photographs will be stored in perpetuity.114
Similar to the reasoning behind voyeurism statutes that
restrict the electronic dissemination of the recorded
information, the ability of omniveillance to spread a person's
image like a virus makes this novel innovation substantially
different from previous newsgathering techniques, and as
such, should be treated differently. Although viral videos
traditionally capture people in private settings, "like the dog
poop girl, you [too] could find photos and information about
yourself spreading around the Internet like a virus. "315
2. Application of the Electronic Dissemination Factor to
Omniveillance
Indiscriminate and widespread dissemination of
recordings from omniveillance is likely to trigger deeper
offense and injury. A perfect illustration of this concept is in
Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, where a reporter
photographed a woman's undergarments when compressed
air jets blew up her skirt while exiting a fun house (think
Marilyn Monroe). 16 It is highly unlikely that the plaintiff
would have initiated the suit if someone had just snapped the
photograph for personal consumption. However, because it
was reproduced in the local newspaper, where all of her
family, friends, and colleagues could see it, the offensiveness
was magnified and the suit became a necessity.1 7 In fact,
reproducing the photograph in this case is probably more
offensive than the initial shock of the snapshot. Another
illustration of this phenomenon is the "dog poop girl"
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2008/jun/050661cd.htm
314. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 8 ("The dog poop girl would have just been a
vague image in a few people's memories if it hadn't been for the photo entering
cyberspace and spreading around faster than an epidemic.").
315. Id. at 2; see also Jonathan Richards, Google to Face Charges over Down's
Syndrome Video, TIMES ONLINE (London), July 25, 2008,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech and web/article439751 Lece
("Italian prosecutors say a video which showed four youths taunting a teenager
with Down's syndrome was an invasion of privacy.").
316. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964).
317. See id. See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) ("In
considering that balance, we acknowledge that some intrusions on privacy are
more offensive than others, and that the disclosure of the contents of a private
conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception
itself.").
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previously discussed."' The original snapshot in the subway
was benign and inconsequential. 319 However, its viral spread
throughout the globe made the invasion and insult to the
victim exponentially more injurious. 320 This shows that the
quantum of propagation is extremely relevant to determine
how a person's privacy is violated, especially in the context of
omniveillance.
This narrowly tailored test will cut to the heart of
omniveillance-widespread, indiscriminate, electronic
dissemination that is indefinitely retained and is easy to
access. Simply e-mailing a single photograph to an
acquaintance, or posting a photograph to a personal web log
(blog) would not incur liability under the third element of the
right to your digital identity. Under this standard, a
tortfeasor must proactively distribute and disseminate vast
quantities of recordings through an electronic medium that
makes these recordings widely and easily accessible for a
prolonged period of time. Factors to consider include the
clarity of the recording reproduced, how the recording was
spread, how users can access the recording, the degree of
detail (including whether facial features are discernible), how
easily a specific person can be located, and how long the
images are stored. None of these factors are dispositive.
Rather, judges will need to develop guidelines to pinpoint
precisely the nature of the dissemination in each case.
For an example ripped from the headlines, a fire chief in
Florida photographed the breasts of a victim who had crashed
into a tree and e-mailed these photographs to several other
fire departments.321 In this case, the victim possessed a
subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
not to be photographed, satisfying the first element of this
318. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 1; see supra Part II.D.1.
319. See id. at 2.
320. Id. at 94. People who are shamed online "[aire unable to escape their
past, which is forever etched into Google's memory." Id. "But a more nuanced
view of privacy suggests that . . . [the case of dog poop girl] involved taking an
event that occurred in one context and significantly altering its nature-by
making it permanent and widespread." Id. at 7. "The Internet, however, makes
gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that never fades. It is available
around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less than a
second." Id. at 33.
321. Florida Fire Chief in Hot Water over Photos of Topless Accident Victim,
Fox NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,320726,00.html.
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tort. Furthermore, this recording of her breasts would be
offensive to a reasonable person, thus satisfying the second
element of this tort. However, because the fire chief only
distributed the picture to a limited circle of contacts, the
quantum of distribution is so minimal that it would not
satisfy the third element of this tort. In the event that one of
his colleagues widely redistributed these images, this tort still
would not apply. The right to your digital identity only
applies to individuals or organizations that perform the
complete act of making the recording and indiscriminately
disseminating it over the Internet. This comports with
Bartnicki, where the Supreme Court found a statute barring
the disclosure of unlawfully intercepted conversations as
unconstitutional because the defendant in the case did not
play a role in acquiring the illegal material.2 2 Thus, neither
the fire chief nor his colleagues would be liable, because none
of them took the photograph and widely distributed it, unless
they were working cooperatively to achieve the massive
distribution.
To further illustrate this element, slightly modify the
facts of Kubach323 and imagine a person entering an HIV
treatment facility, a women's health clinic, or a domestic
violence shelter, who is recorded by an omniveiller. Although
she may disclose her personal circumstances to a close circle
of trustees, she does not intend this disclosure to spread to
the entire Internet.324 The Internet greatly magnifies the
ability of the recording to spread. For these reasons, courts
should look closely at the victim's social circles when
determining if a fact is private, or whether it has become
public by the disclosure.
It is also important to consider the scienter of the
photographer/distributor. Intent to disseminate must exist in
order to incur liability. In terms of Internet dissemination,
intent can be determined by looking at factors such as the
nature of the distribution, the location on the Internet of the
322. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) ("The normal method of
deterring unlawful conduct is to punish the person engaging in it.").
323. See Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994); see
also text accompanying notes 301-05.
324. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 163 ("There is a difference between what is
captured in the fading memories of only a few people and what is broadcast to a
worldwide audience.").
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broadcast, the knowledge of the people who can access the
information, and the precautions taken to limit or encourage
access to the broadcast. For example, a person's intent to
limit the information disseminated can be gleaned from
posting information on restricted Internet page where
viewing is limited by preselection or password. An example of
encouraging dissemination would be an omniveiller sending
private information to popular Internet sites, where he knows
that the editor will reproduce these images for a wider
audience. Furthermore, such popular web sites are
frequently featured in mainstream media stories that would
severely tip the balance in favor of finding liability.
In addition to providing effective remedies for those who
have their privacy violated, the dissemination test would also
serve as a deterrent to omniveillers. Risk-averse companies
would be less willing to indiscriminately disseminate
recordings of everyone because this element might tilt the
scale towards liability. Conversely, when a recording is only
used for a limited use, or is not widely spread, a court is much
less likely to find liability. Although drawing such a line may
be fuzzy in certain cases, closely analyzing the factors within
this element yields an approximate determination that, when
taken in connection with the other elements, are useful
guideposts to determine liability. Therefore, an optimal level
of dissemination can occur with the proper economic
incentives.
D. Element 4-Newsworthiness
The primary concern with any regulation of privacy is the
inevitable clash with the First Amendment. As a threshold
matter, even though a suit brought by a plaintiff under the
right to your digital identity would not involve any
governmental actors, it still must comport with the First
Amendment. 25 Cases from the time of our founding have
consistently held that courts were agents of the government,
and civil litigation was "subject to [the First Amendment's]
constitutional constraint."326 The First Amendment protects
325. See generally N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
326. See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of
the First Amendment,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1267400 (last visited Oct.
26, 2008). See also Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
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omniveillers even though they are not a traditional media
entity, because they provide a forum to share information,
ideas, and opinions.327 However, the goal of the right to your
digital identity is not to prevent companies from creating
accurate maps and navigational tools. The issue is whether
these maps can include crisp images of people on the streets.
As Justice Carter stated in Gill, regarding a magazine article
containing a photograph of an embracing couple, "there is no
reason why the publisher need invade the privacy of John and
Jane Doe for his purpose."328 The magazine article would not
have been devalued if the identity of the couple had not been
revealed.
Any data privacy regulations that will prevent the spread
of private information must pass Constitutional muster and
assuage First Amendment criticism. Notwithstanding that
burden, the First Amendment is not an absolute right. As
well, not all matters are of public concern. The right to your
digital identity will propose a newsworthiness test, based on
the public disclosure of private facts tort329 that exempts most
legitimate matters from incurring liability, and establishes a
delicate equilibrium between privacy and freedom of the
press.
1. Free Speech Is Not an Absolute Right
One of the leading opponents to information privacy
regulations is renowned Professor Eugene Volokh. He argues
"the difficulty [with regulations] is that the right to
information privacy-my right to control your communication
of personally identifiable information about me-is a right to
have the government stop you from speaking about me."310 To
http://volokh.com/posts/1217533219.shtml (Aug. 1, 2008, 10:45) ("[T]he original
understanding of the First Amendment, and also the traditional one in the
centuries since the Framing, is that it does apply to civil litigation, though the
exact scope of the constitutional rules has of course changed over time.").
327. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
328. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
330. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1050-51 (2000); see also Prosser, supra note 37, at 423
(demonstrating that Dean Prosser looked at the privacy tort as creating "a
power of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read"); Diane L.
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis'
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summarize, in order to prevent information about John Doe
from being released, Jane Doe's right to free speech must be
restricted. This is a very compelling argument. However,
viewing this dynamic through the context of omniveillance,
certain flaws in the assumptions made behind this argument
emerge. This section will show that free speech is not an
absolute right, but it is subject to a balancing test, and
privacy and free speech can mutually coexist.
While people do have a limited right to express
information about other people, the speaker's right to free
speech is not absolute. 31 Justice Hugo Black famously stated
that free speech is an absolute right, observing that the First
Amendment is an "unequivocal command that there shall be
no abridgment of the rights of free speech."332  However,
Justice Black's minority position is not widely accepted, as
not all speech is equally protected with the same level of
scrutiny.33 As such, the Supreme Court applies a balancing
approach that weighs free speech against other interests.334
For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
libel, slander, and defamation suits, which all abridge the
speaker's free speech, are constitutional.3 On the topic of
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL. L. REV. 291, 294, 362 (1983) (proposing that the
public-disclosure tort should be "scuttled" because it has a chilling effect on the
"free exchange of personal information"). But cf., SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 12
("If privacy is sacrificed at the altar of free speech, then some of the very goals
justifying free speech might be undermined."). See generally CHARLES FRIED,
MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 108 (2007) ("May
government seek to assure that all speakers have the same opportunity to reach
their audience-and that all audiences have an equal opportunity to hear what
is available to some? The serious pursuit of equality would necessarily mean not
just amplifying the voices of some of the volume and attractiveness of others,
but turning down the volume of speakers who enjoy larger resources.").
331. See McClurg, supra note 73, at 1056.
332. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 56 (Black, J., dissenting).
333. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 758 (1985) ("We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance."); Ohralik v. Ohio Star Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978) (finding that commercial speech is a "subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values"); Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 555, 557 (1989) (arguing that protecting free speech depends on
"making distinctions between low and high value speech, however difficult and
unpleasant that task may be").
334. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that the
freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment does not exempt
reporters from appearing and testifying before state or federal grand juries
because of the importance of criminal trials); SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 128.
335. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 126-28; Rolfs, supra note 72, at 1110.
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freedom of speech and defamation, the sagacious Benjamin
Franklin quipped about the need for balance:
If by the Liberty of the Press were understood merely the
Liberty of discussing the Propriety of Public Measures and
political opinions, let us have as much of it as you please.
But if it means the Liberty of affronting, calumniating,
and defaming one another, I for my part . . . shall
cheerfully consent to exchange my Liberty of Abusing
others for the Privilege of not being abus'd [sic] myself.33
Furthermore, the press does not have full immunity to
publish true facts.337 In many cases the First Amendment
will also yield to copyright law.338 Therefore, a balancing test
must be used to weigh society's interest in keeping something
private against society's interest in learning about that
matter.
339
336. See John H. Summers, What Happened to Sex Scandals? Politics and
Peccadilloes, Jefferson to Kennedy, 87 J. AM. HIST. 825, 826 (2000).
337. Rolfs, supra note 71, at 1111.
338. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (holding that enforcing
copyright law is "compatible with free speech principles"). In addition, there are
many intrinsic similarities between privacy and intellectual property law. See,
e.g., Lawrence Lesssig, Privacy as Property, 69 SOC. RES. 247, 250 (2002) ("Just
as the individual concerned about privacy wants to control who gets access to
what and when, the copyright holder wants to control who gets access to what
and when."); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 250 (drawing from copyright
law to develop the right to privacy); Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can
Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted
Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203, 1206-12 (2002) (noting the "profound
relationship between those who wish to protect intellectual property and those
who wish to protect privacy"). In the same way that authors of creative works
seek control over their creations, people who want privacy strive to control how
their image is used. There are obvious implications to Street View in the
context of privacy as a form of intellectual property, wherein a person can
control how their essence is used. Although the transaction costs to enforcing
such a regime are quite high because of the ease of reproduction of a person's
image, intellectual property law has found ways to solve similar problems. Cf.
SOLOVE, supra note 12 at 186 (stating that while he is not proposing that
privacy should be traded and regulated in the same way patents or copyrights
should, but rather "the law needs better ways to allow people to exercise control
over their personal data," even if it is readily available to the public); Pamela
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN L. REV. 1125 (2000)
(arguing that when companies acquire information from the commons, they
gain the full benefit and fail to internalize the costs, and suggesting that this
market failure could be remedied by granting individuals a property right to
their personal data).
339. See, e.g., Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing
the need to balance an individual's privacy rights against the rights of the
press); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Minn.
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Acknowledging the balancing approach of the First
Amendment, in Dun & Bradstreet, the Supreme Court
plurality held that "speech on 'matters of public concern'...
[is] 'at the heart of the First Amendment's protection' .... In
contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less
First Amendment concern."34 ° The court reaffirmed this
notion in Bartnicki v. Vopper by holding that "privacy
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance."341  The logical
converse of this holding is that for matters that are not of
public importance, privacy interests may be protected. The
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of the public disclosure of private facts tort
on First Amendment grounds in cases such as Florida Star.342
But yet, the Supreme Court worked within the tort and
considered privacy as a balanced component, as opposed to a
casualty, of the First Amendment. Thus, privacy can coexist
with the First Amendment, even under modern Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
However, in the few instances where an individual or
organization records an image of a non-consenting individual
and disseminates it over the Internet with intent to bring
those images to a large audience without any concern for
newsworthiness, the First Amendment right to free speech
may not be able to prevail. Therefore, because free speech is
not absolute, and not all matters are newsworthy, the right to
keep some information private remains constitutionally
viable, and the right to your digital identity tort can coexist
with the First Amendment if it properly balances the
competing interests of freedom of the press and privacy.
2. An Alternate Test to Determine Newsworthiness
By crafting the original newsworthiness exception to the
tort of public disclosure of private facts, Justice Brandeis,
1948) (discussing the need to balance press rights against a person's privacy
rights); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942) ("[E]stablishing
conditions of liability for invasion of the right of privacy is a matter of
harmonizing individual rights with community and social interests.").
340. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 758-59 (1985).
341. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 516 (2001).
342. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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who was a dedicated advocate of the First Amendment while
on the Supreme Court, was able to balance free speech and
privacy. 43 However, since Warren and Brandeis's article, the
understanding of the newsworthiness exception has been
narrowly interpreted and nearly eliminated. The last nail
into the coffin of the newsworthiness exception to the public
disclosure of private facts torts was Florida Star, where the
Supreme Court held that a newspaper could publish the
name of a rape victim.344 The Court found that the
government should only restrict what the press can print in
order to "further a state interest of the highest order."345
Querying what could satisfy this lofty burden, Justice White
expressed in dissent, " '[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the
"ultimate violation of self." ' ",346 It stands to reason that if
withholding the name of a rape victim does not meet a state
interest of the highest order, nothing could ever satisfy this
insurmountable threshold. Justice White concluded that the
tort of public disclosure was greatly weakened.3 47
Scholars have equally eulogized the newsworthiness
exception to the public disclosure tort in the aftermath of
Florida Star. Professor Rodney Smolla wrote that the tort
exists "more 'in the books' than in practice."345 Professor
Richard Murphy describes the tort as "alive, but on life
support."349 Professor Jacqueline Rolfs notes that because of
the narrow class of information that fulfills the test from
Florida Star, the "tort can no longer be an effective tool for
protecting individual privacy."310
Because the Florida Star decision failed to articulate
what factors determine whether a matter is newsworthy,351
any meaningful privacy tort cannot rely upon this case to
develop a realistic interpretation of what is of public interest
343. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 129.
344. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. 524 (holding that the publication of a rape victim's
name does not violate her privacy because the information was available to the
public).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597 (1977)).
347. Id. at 550.
348. Smolla, supra note 71, at 1101.
349. Murphy, supra note 10, at 2388.
350. Rolfs, supra note 71, at 1128.
351. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 542-50 (White, J., dissenting).
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when analyzing invasions of privacy. In order to institute the
right to your digital identity, privacy jurisprudence would
have to catch the current of the rising tide of recent cases and
laws that have resuscitated the newsworthiness exception to
the tort of public disclosure of private facts. In a leading case
to determine whether a subject is newsworthy under
California law-Kapellas v. Kofman, the California Supreme
Court identified three important factors: (1) "the social value
of the facts published," (2) "the depth of the article's intrusion
into ostensibly private affairs," and (3) "the extent to which
the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public
notoriety."352
The Kapellas balancing test is fashioned after (though it
does not cite to) Justice Carter's dissent in Gill, which devised
that "private citizens, who desire to be left alone, should have
and enjoy a right of privacy so long as they do nothing which
can reasonably be said to have news value."353 Because a
person's expectation of privacy decreases as he enters the
proverbial public spotlight, the Kapellas court found that as
the public interest becomes more "substantial," more invasive
intrusions into the person's private life are permissible.5 4
The right to your digital identity tort adopts the three prongs
of the Kapellas test to form its newsworthiness exception.
This test provides a workable framework to deal with
omniveillance that assuages concerns about limiting the press
and, at the same time, minimizes violations of privacy by
creating liability for events that have de minimis social value.
a. Element 4(a)-Social Value of the Recording
Published
The first prong of the newsworthiness exception to the
right to your digital identity tort focuses on the social value of
the matter recorded. Justice Holmes proposed that society
should strive for the truth and "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market."355 Under the marketplace of ideas philosophy,
352. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922-24 (Cal. 1969).
353. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
354. Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922.
355. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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freedom of speech allows society to seek the truth.5 6
However, not all "truths" are created equal. Trivial pieces of
information with negligible societal values do not deserve the
same protection in the marketplace of ideas that more worthy
items do.357  As Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis
observed over a century ago, "[t]he press is overstepping in
every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency."
358
The difficulty in drawing the line between public concern
and private concern is of the utmost difficulty. According to
Professor Solove, "what is of interest to most of society is not
the same question as what is of legitimate public concern ....
[Tjhe media should not have a monopoly on determining what
is of public concern."359 However, classifying too many events
as private could have a chilling effect on the press, as
reporters might become afraid to publish legitimate stories
out of fear of liability.
In response to this fear, the Supreme Court has taken
steps to resolve this dilemma with narrow strikes by applying
"limited principles" to the specific facts of each case, noting
that "the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels
our not resolving anticipatorily."36 ° However, aside from
these jurisprudential vagaries, there is no definitive
constitutional standard to determine the social value of a
matter.361 Although this a difficult line to draw, it is a
necessity for a free society that values the press and privacy
to establish a rule. In dissent in Gertz, Justice Brennan
noted that determining whether an issue is of "general or
public interest" (a similar inquiry to newsworthiness) "would
not always be easy .. . [b]ut surely the courts, the ultimate
arbiters of all disputes concerning clashes of constitutional
values, would only be performing one of their traditional
356. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 131.
357. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758 (1985) ("[S]peech on 'matters of public concern' . . . is 'at the heart of the
First Amendment's protection' . . . . In contrast, speech on matters of purely
private concern is of less First Amendment concern.").
358. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 196.
359. Solove, supra note 168, at 1003-08.
360. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989); see also Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 468, 491 (1974).
361. See Kimberly A. Dietel, Shadow on the Spotlight: The Right to
Newsgather Versus the Right to Privacy, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 131, 132 (1999).
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functions in undertaking this duty."36 2 Refusing to draw a
distinction is to abdicate privacy protections and tip the
scales entirely towards the media.
There are several factors a court can use to determine the
social value of a recording. The California Supreme Court
gave further light to this first prong in Shulman v. Group W
Productions, when it held that something is newsworthy if
some reasonable members of the community have a
legitimate interest in the topic. 63 Another method is to apply
community standards of decency. Others suggest limiting
it to a "valid and valuable public interest" in the item's
publication.365 Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis defined
newsworthiness as that "which makes [a person's] doings
legitimate matters of public investigation"366 and sought to
protect the privacy of "those persons with whose affairs the
community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged
into an undesirable and undesired publicity."367  Professor
Solove contends that "free speech is most valuable when it
contributes to public discussion on issues of policy and
politics. Under this view, speech of private concern is
relatively unimportant. Reporting people's secrets rarely
contributes much to politics." 368
These are very loose standards that have to be carefully
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, in light of the factual
situations, in order to ensure that the freedom of the press is
362. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (Brenan, J.,
dissenting). See also McClurg, supra note 72, at 1083-84.
363. See Schulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485-86 (Cal. 1998).
364. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975). Rather than
adopting a "leave it to the press" approach, the court imposed a higher
standard, holding:
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake with which a
reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say
that he had no concern.
Id.; see also Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort
and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64
IOWA L. REv. 185, 232 (1979).
365. Joseph Siprut, Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for
Expanding the Right of Privacy in Public Places, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 311, 313-14
(2006).
366. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 216.
367. Id. at 214.
368. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 131.
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preserved. Yet none of these standards will allow
omniveillers to cloak and indemnify themselves behind the
newsworthiness exception to indiscriminately reproduce
images of average people engaged in private and insignificant
activities. Because this test will be enforced as a common-law
tort, any of the social value tests, or combination of tests
mentioned above, can be used to determine newsworthiness.
Most of the images recorded and disseminated by
omniveillers would generally not represent anything unique
or special under any of the standards discussed. The reason
is that these images do not have a social value. There may be
instances when a person is photographed in public, perhaps
participating in a parade, a festival, a press conference, or a
crime. These recording would possess adequate social value,
and would satisfy the first prong of the newsworthiness test.
But, a photograph of a dog defecating in a subway car, or a
photograph of a non-famous person walking into an adult
bookstore, would have negligible social value under any
standard, and likely fail this prong of the test.
Unlike the public disclosure of private facts tort, under
the right to your digital identity, the newsworthiness of a
matter is also a factor of how widely a recording is
distributed.369 If a fact is kept within a relatively small circle,
it need not be particularly newsworthy, as friends frequently
share minor embarrassing stories. However, when a
recording is widely spread, the quantum of newsworthiness
must increase commensurately, as the social networks can no
longer contain a small story. For example, if several friends
discussed seeing a girl on a subway refuse to clean up her
dog's waste, because the information is kept in a small circle,
the lack of social value would not incur liability.
Images already captured by the current iteration of
Street View include a man wearing a wedding ring walking
out of adult's club in broad daylight, two woman sunbathing
in bikinis near Stanford University, a woman's
undergarments exposed while leaning into a car, a gentleman
who was caught putting his fingers where they probably
should not have been, and a man creeping into the shadows of
an adult book store.37 0 These regular, mundane, human acts
369. See supra Part III.C.
370. Singel, supra note 94.
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have no social value. Thus, recordings of regular people doing
average things will likely incur liability under this prong of
the newsworthiness exception.
b. Element 4(b)-Depth of Intrusion into Private
Matters
The second prong of the newsworthiness exception to the
right to your digital identity focuses on the depth of the
intrusion into private matters. While the public disclosure of
private facts tort only makes the threshold judgment of
whether an item is newsworthy,371 the balancing test from
Kapellas peers into the content, and factors the subject
matter of the recording into the calculus of whether a person's
privacy was invaded. By focusing on the nature of the
activity, the Kapellas test can be more faithfully applied to
provide society access to newsworthy content, but leave
purely private matters out of the spotlight. In order to
analyze whether an occurrence is ostensibly private, it is
useful to look at the California paparazzi statute, which
assesses liability based on whether the recorded event is a
"personal or familial activity."372
Under the California paparazzi statute, when the
tortfeasor attempts to capture an image of the victim who is
"engaging in a personal or familial activity" the defendant is
liable. 3  So as not to create an absolute bar on
photographing legitimate matters of public interest, the
legislature limited "personal or familial activity" to include
"intimate details of the plaintiffs personal life, interactions
with the plaintiffs family or significant others, or other
aspects of plaintiffs private affairs or concerns." 374
As applied to omniveillance, this analysis is very
important because matters may often seem public at a first
glance, but deeper probing reveals that they are quite private.
Factors to consider when making this determination include
whether the victim was with friends of family, whether the
recording is of an intimate matter, or if society generally
recognizes that matter as private. For this reason, a simple
371. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
372. See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1708.8(b) (Deering 2005).
373. See id.
374. § 1708.8(1).
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factual inquiry into the nature of the recorded activity can
shine light on whether the matter is actually newsworthy, or
is it just "personal or familial activity." If such a recording is
only personal or familial, this second prong of the
newsworthiness test will favor liability. For example, a
person simply walking into a regular building would be a
public matter. However, a young woman walking into a
health clinic would more likely result in the omniveiller
incurring liability.
c. Element 4(c)-Voluntary Ascension to Position of
Public Notoriety
The third prong of the newsworthiness exception to the
right to your digital identity is one of the key factors
distinguishing it from the public disclosure of private facts
tort. In Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, the court found that
"there is a public interest which attaches to people who by
their accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing
or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to
their activities."375  In essence, the court suggested that a
Faustian bargain exists for those who seek fame, as fame is a
traded for the right to be let alone. This notion accords well
with Warren and Brandeis, who noted that "men of the first
class" make "their doings legitimate matters of public
investigation" and "have renounced the right to live their
lives screened from public observation."376
However, not everyone seeks fame-especially in the case
of omniveillance. Distinguishing between those who are
genuinely in the public eye and those who just want to be let
alone, Justice Carter sought to have the public disclosure of
private facts tort "protect the right of the 90% who do not
desire publicity or notoriety and who may be offended by
publications such as that here involved."377 It is inevitable in
375. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Ct. App. 1962).
376. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 215-17.
377. Id. In the context of defamation law, see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) ("[The plaintiff] has relinquished no part of his interest
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory
falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury
than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of
recovery."); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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society that someone who did not aspire to that fame is
occasionally caught in the public spotlight. As Andy Warhol
noted, in the future, everyone will be world-famous for fifteen
minutes.378 When a person was involved in a car accident,
was a witness to a crime, caught a record breaking baseball
at a game, or was photographed in the background of a
parade, there is little that can be done to avoid being thrust
into the public eye.
In Shulman, a victim of a gruesome car accident, who
was videotaped by a reality TV show after her accident, lost a
public disclosure of private facts suit because the court found
that by getting into a car accident, she assumed a position of
notoriety.37 9 By recognizing that the victim of the crash
assumed a position of fame, it is significant that the court
implicitly recognized that all people need to actively or
passively assume notoriety. Fame cannot be presumed as a
natural state.
Dean Prosser argued that people "assumed the risk" of
being photographed when in public." According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[t]here are other individuals
who have not sought publicity or consented to it, but through
their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate
subject of public interest. They have, in other words, become
'news.' "381 Dean Prosser suggested that the court should
defer to the editor's judgments, and in the case of traditional
media outlets, sheer economics dictated that only a limited
number of high profile events could possibly be covered.38 2
378. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 921 n.1
(9th Cir. 2007).
379. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485-86 (Cal. 1998). See
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) ("In some instances
an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a
public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.").
380. Prosser, supra note 36, at 391-92.
381. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 625D cmt. f(1977).
382. Prosser, supra note 36, at 391-92. It is also debatable whether Google
should not be considered a traditional journalist because the ethical guidelines
that have developed in the mainstream media which invariably protect privacy
have not yet developed on the Internet. Compare Summers, supra note 336, at
842 (" '[A] newspaper should not invade private rights or feelings without sure
warrant of public right as distinguished from public curiosity.' "), with SOLOVE,
supra note 12, at 194 ("The mainstream media have established ethical
guidelines (albeit loose ones) to protect people's privacy, but the norms of the
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Thus, the editor would publish some stories at the
opportunity cost of not publishing others. Mundane human
acts would never be published at the opportunity cost of
exciting human acts, such as car accidents or a celebrity
happening. The editor's selection implicitly attaches a value
to anything that is published, and provides a reliable basis for
judges to rely on. This deference in the context of
omniveillance is untenable for several reasons.
First, in the case of omniveillance, everyone in a given
location is photographed without any concern for whether
something important is occurring. The victims of this
unblinking eye are thrust into the limelight without any
reason or cause. There is absolutely no voluntary or even
involuntary ascension to fame. Second, the assumption of
risk requires a person to have "full knowledge of the risks,"
and to disregard the danger.3 Therefore, the assumption of
the risk argument is a non sequitur in the context of
omniveillance, because it is impossible to avoid the limelight.
Pervasive and indiscriminate omniveillance tools amass vast
quantities of information about anyone who has done nothing
to put himself in the limelight, with absolutely no discretion.
The cameras are always rolling, and a person never knows
when he will be photographed. In essence, you cannot stay
away from it. Everyone gets their fifteen minutes of fame,
whether they want it or not.
Third, there is a difference between volunteering to be
seen in public and volunteering to be recorded in public."4 As
Justice Carter observed in Gill, there is a distinction between
what is viewable in public and what is viewable by
reproduction, as what the photographed couple chose to do "in
view of a tiny fraction of the public, does not mean that they
consented to observation by the millions or readers of the
defendant's magazine."385 A "person does not automatically
blogosphere [Internet media] are still in their infancy."). However, the status of
Internet entities as journalists is still to be resolved by the courts. See
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (White House employees
brought defamation action against an electronically-published gossip columnist
and interactive computer service provider).
383. McClurg, supra note 72, at 1039.
384. Id. at 1040.
385. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
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make public everything he does in a public place."386 It is not
enough to engage in any conduct and assume some risk.
Rather, in order to qualify as assumption of the risk for
negligence under the Restatement of Torts,"7 the plaintiff
must assume the particular risk at issue. In the case of
omniveillance, when a person simply goes outside, they are
assuming the risk that someone will see them. However,
unaware that a secret surveillance apparatus is lurking, such
a person does not assume that particular risk of being
recorded. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
assumption of risk specifically requires a knowledge element
that necessitates that the plaintiff "must not only be aware of
the facts which create the danger, but must also appreciate
the danger itself and the nature, character, and extent which
make it unreasonable."3 9 This standard thus does not apply
in the context of omniveillance.
Although a celebrity walking down Rodeo Drive in
Beverly Hills followed by a throng of paparazzi can be said to
have assumed the risk of being recorded, the same cannot be
said when an average person is surreptitiously photographed
by an unmarked vehicle or a hidden camera on a rooftop.
Ubiquitous and omnipresent surveillance essentially prevents
people from avoiding this spotlight. While it may be possible
to escape traditional news media, and give a simple "no
comment" response to an inquisitive reporter, when a person
is being recorded without their knowledge, an abstention
from the media becomes an impossible feat. And, contrary to
Andy Warhol's time, when finding an old story involved
digging through a dusty library or scanning through
microfiche, the fame that omniveillance creates will last much
longer than fifteen minutes. Rather, these images are stored
in perpetuity on the Internet for anyone to find.
In the case of omniveillance, the people who are
photographed did little more than walk outside or open their
curtains. They are not involved in a newsworthy event that
they voluntarily or involuntarily became a part of. In
386. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y 1973), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting Nader v. General Motors
Corp., 255 N.E. 2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970).
387. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1977).
388. McClurg, supra note 72, at 1040.
389. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. b (1977).
387
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addition, there is no easy way to determine if one is even
photographed, as there are no warnings displayed during the
recording. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to
interact in society without a reasonable apprehension that
omniveillance will capture your image for eternity. Because
people are not able to avoid this recording, it is wrong to treat
them in the same vein as people who are thrust into the
limelight because of something that happened to them.
Strictly applying the Restatement's approach, the only
way to avoid assuming the risk is to lock your door, shut your
curtains, and live a concealed life within your own property.39
In the context of omniveillance, society is presented with a
Hobson's choice. People can either live a hermetic life beyond
the eye of omniveillance, or live a life in public and have no
privacy at all. Recognizing the value of privacy and how it
promotes free speech and expression, 91 this outcome is quite
undesirable, and should not be promoted. Therefore, because
most of the people who are photographed by omniveillance
cannot assume the risk, their notoriety is not voluntary, and
the third prong of the newsworthiness exception to the right
to your digital identity will not be met.
3. Omniveillance Applied under the First Amendment
By properly weighing the four factors in the right to your
digital identity tort, the equilibrium between free speech and
privacy can be preserved. By limiting the right to your digital
identity to omniveillance, most plaintiffs who sue traditional
forms of media, namely newspapers, televisions, and
magazines, will not prevail because they usually broadcast a
specific recording for a limited purpose. Plaintiffs who sue
organizations that use limited-purpose recording devices,
namely closed-circuit surveillance cameras in public places
that do not indiscriminately disseminate a recorded image
worldwide, will likely not prevail. Finally, plaintiffs suing
individuals or organizations that use quasi-public
surveillance tools such as traffic-jam cameras, simple web
cameras, and singular digital cameras will not prevail,
because the images taken are generally not spread infinitely
throughout the Internet. Therefore, if a journalist records
390. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 72, at 1040.
391. See supra Part I.C.
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and disseminates a recording of a bank robbery or an
assassination, it is likely that liability would be
inappropriate. Conversely, if a pervasive public monitoring
system recorded and distributed over the Internet a video of a
person whose pants fell down, liability might be appropriate.
This flexible process optimizes the incentive to collect
newsworthy material, but, at the same time, protects people's
inviolate right to privacy.
E. Common-Law Enforcement
It is essential to strike the proper balance when crafting
an effective privacy tort that is not over-inclusive, but at the
same time not under-inclusive. 92 Despite the popularity of
the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004,"9' the federal
legislation left much to be desired and many states passed
subsequent amendments and additions to that law. States
like Washington passed more relaxed legislation, while states
like Louisiana took more draconian measures.394 Rather than
proposing omnibus federal privacy legislation, each state
should have the option to adopt their own interpretation of
this tort through the common law, 95 utilizing judicial
enforcement, which tends to parallel public conceptions. 96 By
allowing the powers of federalism 397 to play out, privacy
interests can be customized and personalized based on
specific characteristics of the particular state.398 California
392. See also SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 120 ("If it is too easy to win a
lawsuit, people will sue too readily, causing people to refrain from engaging in
candid robust speech for fear of being sued .... But without the threat of
lawsuits, online speakers have no legal incentive to remove posts or to resolve
disputes informally.").
393. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-495, 118 Stat.
3999 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004)).
394. See supra Part III.A.
395. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 & n.7 (1967)
(noting that in the criminal law context, "[tihe right to be let alone by other
people ... [is] left largely to the law of the individual States").
396. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 14 (1994)
(noting that "public concurrence sets an outer boundary for judicial policy
making... [and jiudicial ideas of the good society can never be too far removed
from the popular ideas").
397. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) ("The proposed
constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its
antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal constitution; but a
composition of both.").
398. In the context of defamation law, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
389
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can have a lenient standard to deal with the large number of
celebrities, while a smaller state like Iowa or New Hampshire
can have a stricter standard to deal with the lack of
newsworthy events, except during the presidential primaries,
when more lax standards can be used. Ideally, judges can
fine-tune the boundaries of the right to meet the needs of the
citizenry. Allowing localities to differently define privacy
rights is supported by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
defining obscenity according to local community standards of
decency. 99 I have not written this article so that states or
judges adopt this tort in toto. Rather, the purpose of this
article is to allow jurists to look to the factors outlined, and
develop an analysis in order to further pursue privacy
protections. °°
U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) ("We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual. This approach ... recognizes the strength of the legitimate
state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to
reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict
liability for defamation."). See Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842,
845 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) ("Most people affected whether as victims or as
injurers by accidents and other injury-causing events are residents of the
jurisdiction in which the event takes place. So if law can be assumed to be
generally responsive to the values and preferences of the people who live in the
community that formulated the law, the law of the place of the accident can be
expected to reflect the values and preferences of the people most likely to be
involved in accidents-can be expected, in other words, to be responsive and
responsible law, law that internalizes the costs and benefits of the people
affected by it.").
399. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30, 32 (1973) ("To require a State to
structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national 'community
standard' would be an exercise in futility. . . . It is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the
people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas, or New York City. People in different States vary in their tastes
and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of
imposed uniformity.") (citations omitted).
400. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
69 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1765) ("But here a very natural, and very
material, question arises: how are these customs or maxims [the Common Law]
to be known, and by whom is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by
the judges in the several courts of justice. They are the depository of the laws;
the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by
an oath to decide according to the law of the land. Their knowledge of that law
is derived from experiences and study . . . and from being long personally
accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. And indeed these
judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be
given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form part of the common law.").
2009] THE RIGHT TO YOUR DIGITAL IDENTITY 391
Determinative queries can include questions such as
what is the emerging technology du jour, what are the
cultural and normative values of the people with respect to
privacy, how would a reasonable person act in that state,
what is considered offensive, and how embedded is technology
in the society. Such a flexible standard, rather than an
ironclad federal bill, will allow for changes to society so that
this tort remains viable, in contrast with Dean Prosser's
privacy torts, which have stagnated for decades because they
were so rigid. In most cases, the desired remedy by the
victim would be specific performance-removal of the
photograph from the Internet. To avoid suits, risk-averse
companies would likely settle when reasonable requests to
remove an offensive image are made. l  Compensatory
damages can be calculated based on principles similar to
other torts, including harm suffered from intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as well as slander and libel
suits. 2 Unlike other Internet issues, where it is hard to
assert jurisdiction because of the borderless nature of
electronic communications,0 3 in these cases there is a
tangible and physical act occurring in a state that establishes
personal contact-the creation of a recording. Choice of law
can be determined using a place of the injury rule, applying
the law of the jurisdiction where the "plaintiff was when his
feelings were wounded. ' 40 4
CONCLUSION
With technology like Google Street View secretly and
indiscriminately photographing people and reproducing these
images over the Internet, the specter of omniveillance is
looming on the horizon. This article proposes the right to
your digital identity, a tort to balance privacy rights with free
speech, and provide a remedy for victims of omniveillance.
The tort has four factors that are balanced to create a
401. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 123 ("The law should encourage websites
to develop a process by which problems can be adjudicated and resolved, where
bad information can quickly be taken down .... The law works best when it
can hover as a threat in the background but allow problems to be worked out
informally.").
402. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
403. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53-57 (D.D.C. 1998).
404. See Bernstein v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 826 (D.D.C. 1955).
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workable equilibrium between privacy and free speech. This
test emerged from existing privacy torts, borrowing from
many areas of the law to develop a workable framework to
remedy victims of omniveillance. The first element modifies
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and adopts a reasonable
expectation of privacy standard. The second element serv7es
as a reflection on society's changing perceptions of
offensiveness, lowering the standard from highly offensive to
offensive, mirroring contemporary sensibilities. The third
element of the tort focuses on the new, more pervasive
methods of electronic data dissemination over social networks
and viral Internet distributions, and accords greater liability
to larger and more indiscriminate distribution. The fourth
element weighs the newsworthiness exception from the tort of
public disclosure of private facts against the level of intrusion
into an individual's privacy, attempting to strike a fair
balance so that privacy has a chance to outweigh free speech
when applied in our courts. Enforced as a common-law tort,
where each state can define the contours of the tort to meet
its citizens' specific needs, the right to your digital identity is
a viable remedy for victims of omniveillance.
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